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NON-MAJOR-PARTY CANDIDATES AND TELEVISED
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: THE MERITS
OF LEGISLATIVE INCLUSION
KEI TH DARREN EISNERt
Historically, [minor-party and independent] candidates have been fertile
sources of new ideas and new programs, and provide opportunities for the
American public to enter into a diverse and open dialog[ue] on the critical
issues of the day. These candidates often represent views held by large
segments of the disenfranchised of our population, and their inclusion will
surely stimulate discussion of substantive issues .... Including[significant]
independent and minor party candidates is a critical aspect of[democratiz-
ing] the debates and broadening our national dialog[ue].
- Representative Timothy J. Penny, of Minnesota's
Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party1
[National] campaigns [in our political system] serve other purposes besides
electing particular candidates to office. They are also used to educate the
public, to advance unpopular ideas, and to protest the political order, even
if the particular candidate has little hope of election.
- Judge John H. Pratt
That's the beauty of being a third party.... You're not going to win
anyway, so you can just go out and tell the truth.
- SoniaJohnson, 1984 Citizens-Party presidential nominees
t B.A. 1989, Cornell University;J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Pennsylvania.
A paper originally written for Professor C. Edwin Baker's Mass Media Policy class
served as the foundation for this Comment. I am grateful to Professor Baker for
both his guidance and wisdom, and to my Law Review colleagues for their able
assistance. With love, I dedicate this Comment to my parents, and especially to my
father, the best lawyer I have ever known.
1 137 CONG. REc. E397, E398 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1991).
2 Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26,32 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911
(1983).
3 T.R. Reid, Feminism Propels Citizens Party s Nominee: Sonia Johnson Contends
Women in This Society Are Born 'Behind Enemy Lines,' WASH. PosT, Oct. 29, 1984, at
AS.
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INTRODUCTION
The nationally televised presidential debate occupies a role of
singular significance in American politics. In sheer scope of
importance,4 in extent of audience interest5 and breadth of media
coverage 6, the debate stands alone among campaign events. The
charges critics have leveled against debates are by now common-
place: they are superficial; 7 they emphasize image over substance;
8
4 See Debates Gave Voters Information, Insight About Candidates, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Oct. 23, 1984, at 3 [hereinafter Debates Gave Voters] (noting that debates
can have more voter impact than any other single candidate appearance during the
latter stages of a campaign). Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts has contended
that debates are "an integral part of electing our President.... [they are] an
important part of our democratic process." 137 CONG. REC. E643 (daily ed. Feb. 26,
1991). Rep. Penny has argued that "[p]residential debates can make a profound
contribution to the health of our democracy, for they have become an important
forum for exposing citizens to the ideas of candidates running for national office."
137 CONG. REC. E397, E398 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1991).
5 See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. E643 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1991) (remarks of Rep.
Markey) (noting that "nearly 50% of American households with televisions tune in to
Presidential debates"); 137 CONG. REC. E397, E398 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1991) (remarks
of Rep. Penny) (noting that in 1988, 160 million people watched the Bush-Dukakis
debates); DAVIDJ. LANOUE & PETER R. SCHROTr, THEJOINT PRESS CONFERENCE: THE
HISTORY, IMPACT, AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES 1 (1991)
(noting estimates that almost 90% of American adults watched at least one of the
Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960); LEE M. MITCHELL, WITH THE NATION WATCHING:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTuRY FUND TASK FORCE ON TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES 42 (1979) ("The [1960 and 1976] debates have placed the candidates before
the largest audience in history."); Ellen Goodman, Don't Let the Parties Downplay TV
Debates, NEWSDAY, Aug. 9, 1988, at 56 (noting that in 1984 nearly 125 million
Americans watched the Mondale-Reagan and Bush-Ferraro debates).
The 1992 Bush-Clinton-Perot debates attracted the largest audiences in debate
history: 87 million people watched the first debate, 92 million the second, and 91
million the third. See Ben Kubasik, Another 90 Million Saw Third Debate, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 21, 1992, at 17.
See LANOUE & SCHROTr, supra note 5, at 2 ("The media.., continue to regard
debates as events of significant magnitude. For all their complaining about the limits
of the format and the overly rehearsed candidate presentations, journalists expend
large amounts of ink and airtime on the debate story.").
7 See, e.g., Walter Shapiro, What Debates Don't Tell Us, TIME, Oct. 19, 1992, at 32
(noting "the inherent problem with presidential debates: what is remembered is the
theatrics, the contrived drama, the carefully rehearsed sound bites"); Tom Wicker,
Who Needs Debates?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1988, at A23 ("Modern televised Presidential
debates.., have been full of demagoguery, misinformation and exaggeration, with
'victory' being claimed for such trivial reasons as Gerald Ford's misunderstanding of
a question on Poland or Ronald Reagan's amiable jokes about his own age."). The
1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates demonstrated that "there was more to debating on
television than just talking issues." Never.ending Debate (MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour,
Aug. 10, 1987), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File [hereinafter MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshour] (remarks of Roger Mudd).
8 See e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 44-45 ("In determining who had 'won' the
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they foster the trivialization of politics and elevate the office of the
presidency at the expense of the political parties;9 and they divert
the public from the other aspects of the campaign. 10 Although
these charges are not without validity, most contemporary commen-
[1960 Kennedy-Nixon] debates, the most important determinant seemed to be the
'style' of a candidate.., and his personality."); How to Ensure Presidential Debates, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 18, 1987, at 15 (noting complaints that the debates "emphasize personality
and telegenic attractiveness rather than substance and character"); Shapiro, supra note
7, at 33 (lamenting that "[l]ost in the spin control are those rare insightful moments
that foreshadowed what a would-be President actually will do in office, the crises he
will face, and.., the fateful errors that are to be his legacy"); Wicker, supra note 7,
at A23 (commenting that debates are "campaign appearances, not seminars on the
issues"). But see MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 45 (arguing that even conveying an image
has a legitimate role in a presidential election, "especially where the image conveyed
is a reasonably accurate reflection of the candidate. The ability to project a television
image allows a candidate to overcome inaccurate public perceptions of the candidate
or even deep-seated biases"). See also 137 CONG. REC. E643 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1991)
(remarks of Rep. Markey) ("Viewers know that regardless of how well coached or
prepped a candidate may be prior to taking the stage, he or she is alone, unfiltered,
and eye-to-eye with the voter once the debate begins. And that's the way voters like
to judge candidates."); KATHLEEN HALLJAMIESON & DAVID S. BIRDSELL, PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES: THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING AN INFORMED ELECTORATE 15 (1988) (argu-
ing that debates are "powerful vehicles both for informing and for exposing an often-
maligned but nonetheless important characteristic of candidates disparaged as
image"); LANOUE & SCHRoTr, supra note 5, at 134 (proposing that "if candidate
images are, aside from partisanship, the single strongest predictor of presidential
voting behavior, an event that alters these images must be considered electorally
consequential").
Debate commentator Norman Cousins has also observed:
No amount of TV makeup can change the way a man's eyes move, or the
way his lips are drawn under surges of animus or temper. When the camera
burrows into a man's face, the fact that some wrinkles may be covered up
by pancake makeup is not as important as the visibility of the emotions that
come to the surface. The strength of the TV debates derives less from what
is hidden than from what is impossible to conceal.
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 45-46. Indeed, "[w]hatever their weaknesses, the debates
[are] the only time during.., presidential campaigns that the two major candidates
[appear] together side by side and under conditions that they [do] not control." Id.
at 5.
9 See How to Ensure Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15. Seegenerally THEODORE
J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985)
(arguing that the advent of a plebiscitary presidency has resulted in unrealistic
expectations that render contemporary presidential success a virtual impossibility).
By personalizing the candidates, the debates imbue the presidential aspirants with a
sense of power and importance arguably disproportionate to their true role, thereby
drawing attention to individuals rather than issues. See RobertJ. Samuelson, Bottom
Line on the Issues, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1992, at 29 ("Every election creates the illusion
that the president deserves full credit or blame for the economy... [T]he
personalization of policy... obscures [the President's] modest impact.").
10 See How to Ensure Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15.
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tators nonetheless agree that debates do, in fact, inform the public
about issues." In addition, they serve the important functions of
revealing candidate stances; 12 guiding the public in its vote;
18
and reinforcing the electoral choices people have already made.
14
11 See, e.g., LANOUE & SCHROTT, suijra note 5, at 145 ("[M]ore information is
provided by presidential debates than by most other common purveyors of persuasive
messages, including candidate speeches and political advertisements."); MrrCHELL,
supra note 5, at 46 ("Televised presidential debates do indeed, notwithstanding
charges to the contrary, convey information about campaign issues."); Jack W.
Germond &Jules Witcover, Are Presidential Debates Inevitable?, NAT'LJ., May 19, 1990,
at 1244 ("With the number of distorted TV campaign commercials steadily increasing,
the presidential debates become a more essential ingredient than ever for an
informed electorate.").
Two prominent observers are convinced of the impact of debates:
The social pressure to take a sustained view of both candidates creates a
climate more conducive to political learning than any other which the
typical voter will seek or chance upon.
In a campaign season chock full of spot ads and news snippets viewers
turn to debates to provide sustained analysis of issues and close comparisons
of candidates. "Debate" has become a buzzword for "serious politics."
JAMIESON & BIRDSELL, supra note 8, at 5.
12 See 137 CONG. REC. E397 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Penny)
("Presidential debates... have become an important forum for exposing citizens to
the ideas of candidates running for national office."); LANOUE & SCHROTr, supra note
5, at 131 (noting that voters see debates "as a significant source of information about
the candidates and their issue positions"); MrTCHELL, supra note 5, at 21 (debates
serve "as a useful check on the candidates' own versions of their ... positions as
presented in candidate-produced commercials or by other stagecraft").
13 See e.g., LANOUE & SCHROTT, supra note 5, at 131 (noting that voters "view
debates as often decisive to their own choices of how to vote"); id. at 145 ("[D]ebates
do seem to provide the opportunity to enhance voters' ability to choose rationally.");
id. at 2 ("[D]ebates contribute to the factors that ultimately determine how viewers
vote."); How to Ensure Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15 (noting that debates
"provide an opportunity for voters to assess the candidates.., over an extended
period of time, in a live broadcast, without the immediate filter of consultants and
aides"); Marvin Kalb, Campaign Debates: Can They Be Saved?, USA TODAY, Sept. 22,
1992, at 13A ("Every academic study shows that the presidential debates are crucially
important moments in the campaign, when the people take a deep breath to watch,
listen and make a final judgment on the next president of the United States."). Less
knowledgeable or committed voters are drawn to debates because they may be
interested in guidance and information. See LANOUE & SCHRoTr, supra note 5, at
121. For voters possessing limited information and few preexisting biases, the
televised debate may actually have a direct and unmediated effect on candidate and
issue evaluation. See id. at 136.
14 See, e.g., LANOUE & SCHROTT, supra note 5, at 15-16 ("Debates ... are more
important for their ability to reinforce candidate and party preferences than to alter
them."); MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that debates are particularly effective
in reinforcing or crystallizing voter predispositions, and this reinforcement can have
an "important impact" on an election); Debates Gave Voters, supra note 4, at 3
("[P]eople who were leaning toward one of the candidates tended to have their
inclinations reinforced by the debates.").
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Not surprisingly, the debates also stimulate voter interest, 15 a
dynamic that may lead to greater voter participation. 16 Lastly,
debates are of symbolic importance, allowing the voters to engage
in the political process through their connection to the candi-
dates.17  In short, in an age in which the importance of media
exposure for informing the electorate, amassing voter support, and
waging a successful campaign is axiomatic, televised presidential
debates matter.
18
Because debates matter, significant third-party or independent
candidates should be allowed to participate. The argument for
including such candidates, however, cannot rest on their potential
for garnering enough support to win a presidential election.
19
Indeed, the electoral record of independent and third-party
candidates20 in the United States is one of "'nearly total fail-
15 See 137 CONG. REC. E643 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Markey)
("The anticipation of nationally televised face-to-face meetings between candidates is
a galvanizing force in the electoral process. The debates focus public attention [and]
heighten voter interest.... This is an important part of our democratic process.");
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 5, 43 (discussing the dramatic interest in the election
campaign and the candidates which followed the 1960 televised debates).
1 See 137 CONG. REC. S2334, S2334 (remarks of Sen. Graham) (noting that
debates foster a "mutuality between the candidate and the electorate, or the office
holder and the citizen, that is needed for both to participate in the political process
and for democratic government to endure.... [They are] a way of getting people
involved [that] may bring Americans back to the polls"); cf. Bernard C. Barmann,
Third-Party Candidates and Presidential Debates: A Proposal to Increase Voter Participation
in National Debates, 23 CoLUM.J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 441, 442 (1990) (arguing that the
inclusion of third-party candidates in the debates will increase voter participation by
forcing the electoral system to provide the public with information about third
parties, thereby increasing the accountability of elected officials). But see MITCHELL,
supra note 5, at 43 (stating that "[ilt is unclear, however, whether this interest leads
to a higher voter turnout at the polls" and noting that voter turnout after the 1960
debates was only marginally higher than in 1952 and 1956, and that the 1976 debates
did not stop the subsequent downward decline in voter participation).
17 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
1 8 SeeJames Endrst, The Vote is In... And Politics on Television Will Never Be The
Same, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 4, 1992, at A6 ('[The 1992 debates were] a series
of ratings winners that proved once and for all that American viewers are interested
in something more than soundbites."); see also LAN UE & SCHROTT, supra note 5, at
4 ("[D]ebates are often quite influential."); How to Ensure Presidential Debates, supra
note 8, at 15 ("[P]residential debates make an important contribution to the quality
of the campaigns.").
19 This is true despite the strong showing of Ross Perot in the 1992 election. See
infra note 22 and accompanying text.
20 For definitional purposes, this Comment will refer to presidential candidates
not belonging to either the Democratic or Republican parties as independent
candidates, on the one hand, and third-party or minor-party candidates, on the other.
No distinction will be made between the terms third-party and minor-party.
1993]
978 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:973
ure.'" 2 1 Given this record, as well as the apparent improbability
that a third-party or independent candidate could win a presidential
election in a two-party system-notwithstanding Ross Perot's 1992
performance 2 2-participation in debates is unlikely to serve as a
21 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 34 (1966);
see also STEPHEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA: CITIZEN
RESPONSE TO MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 229 (1984) ("Minor parties in America are
condemned to their fate as third place finishers."). The electoral failure of third-party
or independent candidates is perhaps best illustrated by the Bull Moose or
Progressive party, "[ft]he most popular modern third party," which garnered only 27%
of the vote in 1912 despite featuring a former president, Theodore Roosevelt, as its
candidate. See Howard Fineman, Throwing a Mighty Tantrum: The Lure of Third-Party
Candidacies, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1992, at 28; see also TheodoreJ. Lowi, Toward a More
Responsible Three Party System: The Mythology of the Two-Party System and the Prospects
forReform, 16 PS 699, 703 (1983) (noting that "an electorally based third party... has
not been tried seriously on a national scale since the Progressives tried it in 1912").
Given the political reality that every candidate elected to the presidency since
1848 has been a Republican or a Democrat, third-party and independent candidates
are under no illusions about the likelihood of winning elections. They run, not
because they expect to win, but rather because they view a candidacy as an
opportunity to advance their causes. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra, at 188.
22 Clearly, no current discussion of televised presidential debates and non-major-
party candidates would be complete without reference to Ross Perot. Throughout
this Comment then, the discussion will advert to Perot when his experience is
relevant. His bizarre candidacy in the 1992 presidential election is a timely example
of the important role third-party and independent candidates can play in contempo-
rary America. Before withdrawing from the presidential race in the summer of 1992,
Perot enjoyed a remarkable ground swell of support attributable both to a political
zeitgeist disgusted with politics as usual, and a populace thirsting for alternatives. See
Fineman, supra note 21, at 28 (reportinga Republican-sponsored survey revealing that
three-quarters of Americans think that "'the entire political system is broken'"). Yet
though his credibility may have been strained by a campaign that could be
euphemistically described as unorthodox, 19 million voters still cast ballots for him.
See Steven A. Holmes, An Eccentric But No Joke, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at Al
(calling Perot "a political neophyte who said and did enough bizarre things during the
Presidential campaign to allow his critics to brand him as an eccentric or worse," yet
who still managed a better showing than any third-party candidate since Teddy
Roosevelt ran as the Bull Moose candidate more than 80 years ago).
At first blush, the considerable backing Perot garnered, the level of media
attention lavished upon him, and voters' ready acceptance of him as a major player
in the presidential race, would seem to refute much of this Comment's argument
about the nearly insuperable obstacles significant minor-party and independent
candidates face, and the resultant necessity of legislatively insuring their inclusion in
televised presidential debates. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals Perot to be the
exception that proves the rule. Perot is unique in the history of third-party
candidacies: a billionaire political outsider-cum-media magnet who was a distinctly
atypical third-party candidate. See Ronald E. Cohen, Looking Back on This Week's
Campaign Trail, Gannett News Serv., Oct. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
GNS File ("[T]he Texas tycoon has no precedent in American presidential poli-
tics-mounting a full-fledged, third-party, multi-million dollar populist candidacy a
month before election day."). Absent the ability to bankroll one's campaign to the
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springboard to electoral victory for such candidates.23  Electoral
success, however, is not the touchstone by which the importance of
a third-party campaign should be measured. Through policy
innovation 24 and the potential to influence the electoral out-
come, 25 through their assurance that major parties will be held
accountable 26 and that disaffection with the two-party structure
will be channeled into voter participation rather than a rejection of
the political process,2 7 third-party and independent candidates play
a vital role in the American political process, a role independent of
electoral success.
This Comment will articulate justifications for the inclusion of
significant minor-party or independent candidates in televised
presidential debates. Minor-party participation in debates would
allow such parties better to fulfill the historically crucial roles they
play in our democracy.2 8  In addition, enhanced third-party or
independent candidate participation would improve the debates,
tune of 60 million dollars, see Irwin Arieff, World Welcomes Clinton and His "New
Beginning' Reuters, Nov. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File, a
third-party or independent candidate would find the impediments to informing the
voters and enriching the political dialogue-to say nothing of attracting
votes-daunting. See The Wild Card, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1992, at 25 (noting that "a
brash billionaire can well afford to rush in where ordinary politicians fear to tread").
In fact, juxtaposition of the Perot phenomenon with the plight of a conventional
third-party or independent candidate dramatically underscores this Comment's thesis.
23 The claim of one minor-party candidate, who asserted that "if I had been
involved in the debates ... I would have gotten millions of votes," thus seems
spurious. Garry Sturgess, Non-partisan or Bipartisan?: Candidate: Presidential Debate
System is Illegal, LEGAL TIMES, July 1, 1991, at 2 (statement by New Alliance Party
candidate, Lenora Fulani, referring to her 1988 presidential bid). Although
participation in debates would certainly render third-party candidates, and thus third
parties, more competitive, it would on its own neither enable minor parties to
surmount the many institutional obstacles confronting them, nor transform the two-
party system into a system in which third parties could compete on equal footingwith
Democrats and Republicans.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 40-52.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 65-68.
28 In the words of ChiefJustice Earl Warren:
All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of
our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political
activity by minority, dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in
the vanguard of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately
accepted. Mere orthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores is not to be
condemned. The absence of such voices would be a symptom of grave
illness in our society.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957).
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providing benefits to the electorate as a whole.29 This Comment
will argue that inclusion could be best accomplished through the
legislative process, by making the receipt of federal campaign
matching funds contingent on participation in debates in which
significant national third-party and independent presidential
candidates appear.
3 0
Part I of this Comment discusses the many important roles third
parties play in our governmental system. Part II provides a brief
overview of the considerable structural, political, and legal barriers
third-party and independent candidates face as they endeavor both
to amass voter support and to inform the electorate. From the
single-member-district plurality system to federal campaign funding
laws tilted to benefit the major parties, and from ballot-access
restrictions to the omnipresent threat of being co-opted or delegi-
timized, third parties continually struggle for their very survival.
These already substantial impediments are exacerbated by the
socializing force of the two-party system and by media discrimina-
tion.
Part III discusses how exclusion from televised presidential
debates harms significant third-party and independent candidates,
and how inclusion would result in better third parties and better
debates. Exclusion frustrates third parties' effective fulfillment of
their roles, further delegitimizes them, and fosters the deterioration
of the symbolic value such parties hold for their supporters. These
effects could ultimately lead to their supporters' political nihilism
and a consequent drop-off in voter participation. Inclusion, in
contrast, helps legitimize third parties,3 l enabling them better to
influence the political agenda. Inclusion would be more than a
largely symbolic gesture: it promises to stimulate voter interest
while concretely improving debates both by reducing major-party
opportunities to manipulate them,3 2 and by encouraging a fuller
discussion of the relevant issues of the day.
3 3
29 SeeJAMIESON & BIRDSELL, supra note 8, at 16 (asserting "that improved debates
can strengthen the political process").
30 For a discussion of the criteria that may be used in determining who qualifies
as a "significant" third-party or independent candidate, see infra notes 184-229 and
accompanying text.
31 Ross Perot's inclusion in the 1992 debates, for example, was an undeniable
boon to his campaign. See David Firestone, Perot's Impressive Loss, NEWSDAY, Nov. 4,
1992, at 29 (noting that Perot's impressive debate performance buoyed his campaign).
32 For contemporary examples of major-party attempts to manipulate the debate
format, see infra notes 115-16, 196-200 and accompanying text.
33 The late inclusion of Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential debates is a timely, if
TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
In Part IV, this Comment examines the inadequacy of recent
judicial responses to third-party requests for inclusion in nationally
televised debates. Three times in the past five years third-party
candidates have petitioned federal circuit courts to intervene on
their behalf; three times circuit courts of appeal have, on different
bases, turned a deaf ear to these entreaties.3 4 Now, one third-
party candidate's recent judicial effort, apparently reprising the
substance of earlier litigation, seems poised to snake its way through
the federal courts.35 Regardless of these cases' outcomes, howev-
er, the judiciary is an inappropriate vehicle for assuring the
inclusion of such candidates in the presidential debates. To be
practicable, such inclusion must be based on a consideration of
political realities, on the weighing of societal costs and benefits, and
on the finely tailored judgments that are the peculiar province of
the legislature.
Finally, Part V of this Comment discusses three recent legislative
initiatives which would institutionalize presidential debates by
making the receipt of certain federal campaign funds by the major-
party candidates contingent on their participation in such debates.
This section will first analyze the constitutionality of such proposals,
imperfect, example. Only from a sufficiently historical perspective will analysts be
able to assess Perot's complex impact on the debates. At this stage, however, we can
safely assert that just by stimulating public interest in the debates, and by honing in
on the deficit issue, Perot enlivened the dialogue. Perot's late and unexpected re-
entry into the presidential race, however, meant that he was captive to the formats
and requirements already hammered out by the two major candidates without a non-
major-party candidate's presence or interests in mind. See, e.g., Michael K. Frisby,
Highly Focused Debate Plan is Seen, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1992, at 6 (noting that
though Perot was invited to the debates, he was not allowed to alter any of the
arrangements the two major parties had negotiated); Michael Kranish, As Debate Nears,
Camps Weigh Choice of Journalists, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1992, at 13 (noting that
Perot's campaign was given no say about which journalists would participate in the
debates). Additionally, the unusual nature of his candidacy characterizes him as
something less than the apotheosis of the issue-oriented third-party candidate who
attempts to shift the focus of the two major-party candidates to her own agenda. See
Fineman, supra note 21, at 28. ("Most [third-party candidates] have been sore losers
who stormed out of their party to champion a specific issue or to defend a region or
class. Perot's calling card is an attitude, not an ideology-and he's intriguing to all
walks."). Thus, Perot's unique status meant he was not ideally suited to enrich the
debate or dialogue; he did so, however, nonetheless.
3' See Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Fulani II], cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Fulani !]; Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); see also infra notes 122-62 and accompanying text.
35 See Fulani v. Brady, No. 92 Civ. 7182 (SWK) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1992) [hereinafter
Fulani III].
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concluding that the weight of Supreme Court precedent militates in
favor of a finding of constitutionality. Turning to the substance of
the bills, this Comment urges that the first proposal is problematic
because it contemplates the participation of only the two major
parties. Furthermore, the second is flawed because, although it
insures the inclusion of all candidates who meet certain objective
criteria, it allows the perpetuation of the current bipartisan
sponsorship of the debates by the two major parties. Such sponsor-
ship surely is not in the best interest of those qualified third-party
or independent candidates clambering for inclusion. In contrast,
the third proposal requires nonpartisan sponsorship and includes
realistic criteria that would enable significant non-major-party
presidential candidates to participate in these fora. This Comment
analyzes the third proposal, concluding that it should be adopted
because it represents the best hope of providing for the presence of
more than just two candidates in presidential debates.
Six elections since 1960 have been the occasion for presidential
debates.3 6  These debates have been attended by considerable
discussion about debate format, financing, timing, and frequen-
cy.3 7 A detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of
the present inquiry. Rather, this Comment advocates reformation
of the presidential debate system to encourage broader participation
of minor-party candidates as an important and useful first step in
debate reform. Additional substantive and structural change, a
necessary second step in the improvement of presidential debates,
will naturally flow from, and can only be built upon, such funda-
mental reform.
3 8
36 After the four Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960, both Lyndon Johnson and
Richard Nixon refused to engage in debates, resulting in a 16-year interim before
Carter debated Ford in 1976. See LANOUE & SCHROTT, supra note 5, at 16-17.
Televised presidential debates have been held in every election since, with Carter
debating Reagan and Reagan debating Anderson in 1980, Reagan debating Mondale
in 1984, Bush debating Dukakis in 1988, and Bush, Clinton, and Perot debating each
other in 1992. See id. at 24-43; Kubasic, supra note 5, at 17. With the exception of
the 1980 debate between Republican nominee Ronald Reagan and independent
candidateJohn Anderson, and the Bush-Clinton-Perot debates in 1992, third-party
candidates have been excluded from presidential debates. See Barmann, supra note
16, at 442 n.8.
37 The major-party candidates invariably haggle over the elaborate details of the
rules of engagement. See Goodman, supra note 5, at 56; Evans and Novak: Transcript
#127, at 10 (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 22, 1992) (remarks of Charles Black,
Bush Campaign Senior Advisor) ("[T]here's usually a deadlock about [debates]....
But these things work out. It's like any other negotiation.").
58 For a useful discussion of some recent proposals for substantive reform of
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[Ojur political system needs other parties to keep the major parties honest,
to force the major parties to think about ideas they would normally disavow
out of hand, and to bring into the system those people who feel they have
no particular stake in the process any more. Strong; as opposed to weak,
minority or alternative parties will be like yeast in the bread of American
politics.
3 9
The most obvious and. concrete role third parties serve is that of
policy innovators. 40 The direct election of senators, women's
suffrage, and the graduated income tax were all issues that third
parties espoused first,41 as were railroad regulation, high standards
for civil service, and the encouragement of both labor unions and
cooperatives. 42 Third parties occasionally shape the course of
American politics,43 even, altering the political agenda when the
major parties have ignored issues and options.44 The position of
a third-party or independent candidate-that of an outsider, fringing
the American body politic-accounts in large measure for her ability
to serve as a wellspring of policy initiatives. As one writer,
recounting the 1980 presidential race and that John Anderson's
positions were at once bolder and more innovative than those of
Ronald Reagan, explained: "[S]uch is clearly the luxury of a
candidate with little to lose."
45
Ironically, just as it is true that "[w]hen the major party
leadership continues to focus on an increasingly irrelevant agenda,
debates, seeJAMIESON & BIRDSELL, supra note 8, at 194-221.
39 Arthur Unger, BillMoyers-'conscience ofAmerican TV', CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR,
Oct. 31, 1980, at 19 (quoting Bill Moyers).
40 The goal of policy innovation is one quite separate from that of electoral
success. Many third-party and independent candidates run not to win, but to draw
attention to the single issue for which their candidacies stand. For example, Sonia
Johnson, a 1984 Citizens Party candidate for president, was candid about her use of
the party as a vehicle for her feminist ideology. See Reid, supra note 3, at A5.
I See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 8.
42 See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 84.
43 See id. at 9.
44 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983) ("Historically political
figures outside the two major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and new
programs; many of their challenges to the status quo have in time made their way
into the political mainstream."); ROSENSTONF ET AL., supra note 21, at 8.
45 LANOUE & SCHROTr, supra note 5, at 25-26; see also ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra
note 21, at 222-23 (arguing that when major parties are unable or unwilling to deal
with new issues, even those which concern a substantial portion of the electorate,
minor parties can play a significant role).
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third parties become an important voice of change," 46 it is also
true that the policy innovation responsible for a third party's
temporary popularity becomes the instrument of its demise. When
a minor-party attracts substantial backing, one or both major
parties, anxious to capitalize on the third party's popularity and win
over new supporters, seizes the minor party's ideas as its own.
47
And once a minor party's platform has been adopted by a major
party, the minor party's raison d'8tre is often extinguished, as is its
viability.
48
The success of these third-party policy innovations, then, is
largely a function of major-party efforts to co-opt minor-party
support. The gains thus realized by the disadvantaged in our society
are due less to the democratic nature of our political system than to
the use of a suddenly popular issue by one major party as a
"brickbat" against the other.4 9 These policy innovations are also
46 ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 222-23.
47 See id. at 8. Major-party response to Perot's initial withdrawal from the 1992
presidential race dramatized how minor-party support is assimilated. Both the
Republican and Democratic campaigns solicited the support of Perot's backers
immediately after his withdrawal, with each side claiming that its platform was similar
in important respects to Perot's, and could better accommodate the concerns of his
followers. See Steven Heilbronner, Clinton, Bush Race for Perot's Army, UPI, July 6,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting that Bush and Clinton
"scrambled... to present themselves as the natural heirs of Ross Perot's supporters,
signaling an intense contest for the disenchanted voters"). After Perot's re-entry, the
Clinton camp skillfully endeavored to adopt Perot's strident anti-government, anti-
politics-as-usual stance. As one reporter noted a scant eight days before the election:
Mr. Clinton launched no... specific attack on Mr. Perot or his proposals.
Instead, he used a classic Clinton campaign tactic-appropriating elements
of his opponent's most effective pitch-to tell voters he is on their side
against the Washington insiders who he said have claimed the White House.
Gwen Ifill, Despite Perot Surge, Clinton Keeps Sights on Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992,
at A14; see also Robin Toner, Handling Perot: A Very Delicate Affair, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 1992, at Al (noting that "the 1992 Presidential campaign [ended] as it began, with
strategists in both major parties trying to chart, quantify, defuse or turn to their
advantage the mercurial candidacy of Ross Perot").
48 Thus, although one commentator's criticism that minor-party candidates
generally have no long-term impact, and are akin to "shooting stars," is largely
accurate, it misses the point. See LARRY J. SABATO, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN 38
(1988). Although a major party's adoption of any aspect of a third-party or
independent candidate's platform may demonstrate the extent of such a candidate's
ability to contribute to the political process, the contribution is not inconsequential.
Long-term political viability, on the other hand, seems less important than an ability
to affect the current national dialogue.
4 9 See GERALD JOHN FREsIA, THERE COMES A TIME: A CHALLENGE TO THE Two
PARTY SYSTEM 14 (1986); ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 224.
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co-opted to prevent erosion of major-party support.5" Periods of
third-party strength indicate major-party failure to represent
citizens' political demands, 51 and the major parties are quick to get
the message. 52  Although the political dynamic of co-optation
exposes a cynical reality of two-party politics, it nonetheless
dramatizes a key function of minor parties: by raising issues which
the major parties feel compelled to seize upon as their own, third
parties serve as useful catalysts for policy change.
In some situations, third parties can even have a stake in
affecting electoral outcome. 53 As of 1980, third parties controlled
enough votes in the right states to have changed, at least theoretical-
ly, one-third of the electoral college results. 54 As one historian
notes, "[a] glance through American history would seem to indicate
that [a vote for a third party] is probably the most powerful vote
that has ever been cast."55  A calculating third-party cam-
paign-such as that of Dr. Lenora Fulani, 56 whose asserted elector-
al strategy in 1988 was to cost Michael Dukakis the election by
denying him ten percent of the black vote57 -may be sufficiently
50 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 224.
51 See id. at 4, 215.
52 See Lowi, supra note 21, at 703.
53 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 222.
54 See id. at 4. This assessment predates the 1992 election.
55 John Hicks, The Third Party Tradition in American Politics, 20 Miss. VALLEY HIsT.
REv. 26, 26-27 (1933). But cf. FRESIA, supra note 49, at 200 (arguing that the
challenge to a two-party system must come from the creation of a multi-party system,
not from third parties, which either play minor roles in our two-party system or
become mere appendages of the major parties). To say that a third party can affect
an electoral outcome, however, is not to say that it usually does. Perot's support, for
example, seemed to derive rather equally from both the Republican and Democratic
camps. See R.W. Apple, Jr., The Economy Falters, A President Falls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 1992, at Al, B5 (noting that exit polls indicated that Perot's support came from
both parties, with slightly more people indicating they would have voted for Clinton
ifPerot had not made his late re-entry); Ronald Brownstein, Economic Concerns Fueled
Clinton's Drive To Victory, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at Al (reporting an exit poll
indicating that "Perot cut a broad swath down the center of the electorate ... [but]
Perot's presence had no meaningful impact on the overall national vote").
56 The remainder of this Comment will allude, with some frequency, to Lenora
Fulani and her past and present candidacies for president. Fulani, a recipient of
federal matching funds for both the 1988 and 1992 campaigns, has engaged in
protracted yet unsuccessful federal litigation to gain inclusion on the televised
debates. As a case study of a third-party candidate with a colorable claim for such
inclusion-a claim necessarily based on, and one that must be objectively assessed by,
total funds raised and ballots accessed-Fulani's recent history is indispensable to a
full and fair discussion of the topic at hand. The author wishes to stress, however,
that nothing in this Comment should be deemed as an endorsement of Fulani, her
party, or her views.57 See Andrew Rosenthal, Independent Candidate Plays a Spoilers Role, N.Y. TIMES,
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threatening to compel a major party to compromise with such a
candidate or to co-opt her views.58 Obviously, the closer the race
between the two major parties-and the broader the support a third
party has-the greater the urge to compromise or co-opt.
59
Third parties also play a crucial role in keeping the major parties
accountable, 60 and in shaping the programs the Democrats and
Republicans pursue while in office. 61 The full extent of the third-
party role in shaping public policy is not always immediately
apparent; third-party ideas often filter gradually into major-party
programs. 62 In many cases, however, the influence of third parties
is more obvious and unmediated.68 The nettlesome presence of
minor parties, then, is a subtle inter-election goad to major parties,
who adopt their positions not out of an altruistic desire to represent
minority viewpoints, but in order to put third parties out of
business.
64
Third parties also serve as conduits for the expression of
discontent with the major parties. 65 This role is crucial given the
downward spiral in voter turnout in recent decades.66 By giving
the disaffected a voice and a corresponding desire to take part in
the political process, third parties encourage the electoral participa-
Oct. 26, 1988, at A23.
58 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 224. Fulani, however, lacked
sufficient voter support to have such influence.
59 This point is aptly illustrated by the Democrats and Republicans promptly
courting Perot's supporters following his abrupt abandonment of his quest for the
presidency. See supra note 47.
60 A significant third-party presence could "clarify the policies, programs and
accountability of the two major parties." Lowi, supra note 21, at 705.
61 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 222 (noting, for instance, the
profound impact that George Wallace's candidacy had on the Nixon administration's
civil rights policies). Ross Perot, for example, may prove a "useful catalyst" for
forcing the Clinton Administration to confront the deficit issue. See ... As Third
Parties Wait, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 1992, at 18A; see also infra note 73.62 See e.g., DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 81
(1974) ("[M]ajor portions of the New Deal programs of Franklin Roosevelt are ...
attributed to the Progressive platforms of the preceding decades.").
63 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
64 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 221.
65 See id. at 5-6, 215. Again, the example of Perot proves fruitful. See infra note
67.
66 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1989, at 258 (109th ed. 1989) (table 433 showing that the
percentage of the voting age population casting presidential ballots has consistently
declined from 62.8% in 1960 to 50.2% in 1988); see also FRESIA, supra note 49, at 196
(noting that the "genuinely disaffected in a political system like ours" are likely to
withdraw).
TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
tion of the disenchanted and insure that these marginal constitu-
encies do not resort to less acceptable forms of protest, such as civil
disobedience or withdrawal from the political process.67  This
disillusionment is thus channeled from a general rejection of the
American system of government to a protest against the two-party
67 See id. at 26-27 (arguing that "movement politics" enables "those who are
disenchanted with the rewards and the processes of the two party system ... to feel
good about political participation"); ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 224
(suggesting that voters disaffected with the two major parties "might have to turn to
less accepted forms of action" if the third-party route is closed off to them).
The coniemporary example of Ross Perot and his off-again, on-again candidacy,
is illustrative. Through his candidacy Perot mobilized those voters disillusioned with
two-party politics, and encouraged their participation in the political process during
the 1992 presidential race. His supporters were the "perennially quiet constituency-
the Great American Middle-[that] was coming to life, expressing its anger,
discovering its strength," those citizens who were "solid, sane, decent and disgusted
with politics as usual." Joe Klein, Perot's People: Second Thoughts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5,
1992, at 44,44. "Perot became a blank screen on which millions of American voters
could project their discontents, an empty vessel into which they could pour their
hopes for a government that is free from partisan conflict and brokered compro-
mise." Tom Morganthau, The Quitter: Why Perot Bowed Out, NEWSWEEK, July 27,
1992, at 28,30. One commentator referred to him as "the inspirational commander
of a new American revolution." Jonathan Alter, Perot's Last Casting Call, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 12, 1992, at 44, 44. Even after Perot pulled out of the race, "thousands ...
disillusioned with conventional politics, stayed in a movement that seemed to promise
fresh approaches." Laurence I. Barrett, Remember Ross?, TIME, Sept. 21, 1992, at 25,
25. The support Perot retained or resurrected after his re-entry into the race was
attributable to "the frustration and iconoclasm of people too proud to admit they'll
succumb to a choice they consider dismal." Klein, supra, at 44.
Prior to the 1992 election, the alienation of the American voter was well-
demonstrated by traditionally poor and consistently worsening voter turnout for
presidential elections. See supra note 66. The relatively high voter turnout in the
1992 presidential election thus illustrates the crucial role of third-party candidates like
Perot in stimulating voter participation: credit for heightened voter interest is at least
partially attributable to Perot, who was viewed as both a viable alternative to the
major-party candidates and as a means of asserting "anger with the recession." See
Richard Benedetto, Presidential Election: Voter Turnout, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 1992, at
13A (noting estimates that Perot garnered nearly 20 million votes from the record
104 million cast, surpassing pre-election estimates and indicating that "he pulled many
who might not have voted otherwise"); Robert Pear, 55% Voting Rate Reverses 3-Year
Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B4 ("Even more influential [than the recession]
was Ross Perot's specific appeal to people who felt disenfranchised and had not voted
in recent elections .... Mr. Perot caused the overall increase in turnout.").
Additionally, one can demonstrate that third-party candidacies increase voter
participation by examining election statistics from previous years. In 1988, for
example, nearly 900,000 voters cast their ballots for third-party candidates. THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 424 (Mark S. Hoffman et al. eds., 1992).
Denied the alternative of a third-party or independent candidate and forced to pick
between the two major-party candidates, many of these voters may have withdrawn
from the political process and not voted.
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system, which an increasingly large segment of the American public
has come to view with distrust or indifference. 68 As one indepen-
dent and minor-party presidential candidate commented: "I. .. see
myself running against the two-party system that is tremendously
unresponsive to most American people, and definitely to blacks."
69
The existence of third parties also has symbolic significance,
both from the standpoint of the individual voter and that of the
political system in general. Although in terms of achieving direct
results, a third-party vote may be viewed as futile,70 the individual-
ized act of supporting a minor-party or independent candidate is
not. To vote for a candidate who espouses an issue in which one
fervently believes is to experience an empowerment that endures,
despite the electoral failure of one's chosen candidate. Paradoxical-
ly, casting a ballot for a major-party candidate may provide no such
sense of empowerment, particularly if that party ignores or
disagrees with one on an issue of great personal significance.
The existence of the third-party presidential candidate is also a
symbol of a democratized electoral process, one in which anyone
68 See MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES,
1952-1980 xv (1984) (arguing that the two major parties, "[o]nce the central guiding
forces in American electoral behavior... are now perceived with almost complete
indifference by a large proportion of the population"); Lowi, supra note 21, at 702
(concluding that the "dramatic increase" in voters who refer to themselves as
independents explodes the myth of the sufficiency of the two-party system); Kathryn
A. Dunn, Note, Time for Fairness in the Presidential Electoral Process: Major and Minor
Party Candidates in Competition, 6 J.L. & POL. 625, 630 (1990) (asserting that the
decline "in major party affiliation indicates citizen dissatisfaction with the major-party
candidates").
A particularly trenchant demonstration of current voter disgust with the two
major parties is the fact that 50% of the 35% of the American electorate favoring Ross
Perot inJune 1992 indicated "they weren't voting for him so much as voting against
the others.... Voters are in a throw-the-bastards-out convulsion." Tom Mathews,
President Perot?, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 1992, at 18, 18.
69 Rosenthal, supra note 57, at A23 (quoting Lenora Fulani). Fulani has also
stated that she plans to build "a genuine opposition force to the bipartisan anti-
democracy known as the American electoral system." Carleton R. Bryant, Three More
Toss Hats Into Presidential Ring, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at A5.
70 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 16-17 (stating that "[b]ecause citizens
know third parties have very little chance of winning, they prefer not to waste their
votes on them"); supra text accompanying note 55. Political scientist Theodore Lowi
assails the "myth" that a vote for a third-party candidate is a wasted vote:
If the vote is for a candidate of a dissident party, it is a protest vote which
can instill considerable anxiety in the leadership of the major parties. If the
vote is for a candidate of a programmatic third party, a more substantive
message is sent; and history shows that these messages are almost always
received by leaders of the major parties.
Lowi, supra note 21, at 703.
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who can mobilize support can run for the presidency. More than a
symbol, in fact, third parties prevent the Democrats and Republi-
cans from irrevocably institutionalizing themselves as the only
options with which voters are presented. In terms of fulfilling the
symbolic function of third parties, their existence-rather than their
electoral success-is the issue.
71
The roles third parties play, then, serve as a means of encourag-
ing reflective participation in the political system. This reflective
participation broadens the limited range of political discourse
inherent in the two-party system,72 thereby enriching the political
process. 73 The emerging visibility of third-party challenges since
196874 underscores the promise third-party and independent
candidates hold for broadening and enriching our national dialogue.
71 The presidency "stands as a living symbol of the nation." Therefore, the
symbolic significance of the vote in a presidential election is correspondingly great.
Dom Bonafede, It Does Make a Difference, NAT'LJ., Nov. 8, 1980, at 1898. Third-party
and independent candidates who bring the disenfranchised back to the voting booth
help them to reaffirm their stake in both the electoral process and the concept of
democracy.
72 See FRESIA, supra note 49, at 124 (stating that "[u]nreflective participation in the
two party system accepts [a] limited range of political debate and the policy options
that flow from it").
73 Perot again serves as a fruitful example. His late re-entry into the presidential
race a mere 33 days before Election Day diminished his status as a serious
presidential contender and diluted the full impact he might have had in broadening
the political dialogue. Yet one could say that "by focusing attention on the deficit,
Perot ... helped elevate the last stage of a race that might otherwise have been
preoccupied entirely with mudslinging." Eleanor Clift & Ginny Carroll, Perot: Pulling
the Race Out of the Mud, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1992, at 34, 34; see also Howard Fineman,
Running Scared, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1992, at 47, 48 (noting that a Clinton presidency
will have to contend with Perot, "a sanctified, one-man Greek chorus on the evil of
deficits"); Robin Toner, Perot Re-Enters the Campaign, Saying Bush and Clinton Fail to
Address Government 'Mess, 'N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al (noting that after Perot re-
entered the race, "it was clear that [he] would affect the tone and the dynamic of the
dialogue").
As election results poured in, analysts attempted to assess Perot's impact on the
national dialogue. See, e.g., Tom Morganthau, Citizen Perot, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1992,
at 23, 28 (arguing that before Perot re-entered the race "there was little or no sign
that George Bush and Bill Clinton were prepared to discuss [the] primal issues" of
deficit control and generational fairness); Robin Toner, Clinton Wins Decisive Margin
in the Voter Poll Across Nation After 12 Years of G.O.P. Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992,
at AS, B3 ("Mr. Perot's influence could be spied throughout the voting, not only in
the salience of the deficit issue, but also in voters' attitude toward 'divided
government.' Mr. Perot railed about 'gridlock' throughout the campaign, and the
voters ... seemed to share his view .... ").
74 See generally ScoTr KEETER & CLIFF ZUKIN, UNINFORMED CHOICE 193 (1983)
(noting arguments that third-party challenges have grown steadily "more credible").
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II. THE BARRIERS FACING THIRD PARTIES
Despite the useful role third parties play in our political system,
a host of structural, legal, and political barriers confront them at
every turn. Structurally, the electoral college's plurality basis, with
its winner-take-all format in each state, helps the Democrats and
Republicans to win presidential elections. In plurality elections,
party identification alone virtually assures that either the Democrats
or the Republicans will emerge victorious.75  Faced with the
prospect of narrowly losing in a state and getting nothing, a third
party often succumbs to the pressure to moderate its agenda and
coalesce with one of the major parties. 76 This incentive to co-
alesce has constrained the viability of minor parties, often account-
ing for their inability to field presidential candidates in successive
elections.
77
75 See Maurice Duverger, Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later, in ELECTORAL LAWs
AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 69, 69 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart
eds., 1986) (arguing that plurality voting tends to create and maintain two-party
systems); see also FREsIA, supra note 49, at 202-03 (discussing the impact of plurality
elections in general and the electoral college system in particular on third-party
candidates); ROSENSTONEETAL.,supra note 21, at 16-17 (noting that a "candidate who
comes in second or third in a particular state does not win a single electoral vote
regardless of his percentage of the popular vote"). Ross Perot's performance in the
1992 presidential election is a case in point. Though he garnered better than 18%
of the popular vote cast, he tallied zero electoral votes. See Carl M. Cannon, Clinton
Victorious, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 4, 1992, at Al.
The same effect obtains on the congressional level, where the single-member
district system holds sway, in which voters elect only one representative from each
district. Unlike European parliamentary proportional representation systems, the
American system's winner-take-all outcome does not reward second- or third-place
finishers, thereby discouraging minor-party participation. See Dunn, supra note 68,
at 625. A minor-party supporter's pragmatic response is thus often not to vote her
true preference, "but to vote for the lesser of two evils who has a chance of winning."
FRESIA, supra note 49, at 202. A minor party's electoral futility at the congressional
level sows the seeds for its failure at the presidential level: without support at the
local level, a party stands slim chance of winning a presidential election. The single-
member-district plurality system could thus be considered the "single largest barrier
to third party vitality." ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 18. A vote for third-
party candidates-at either presidential or congressional level-is thus a leap of faith,
a gesture of the most symbolic kind.
76 See FRESIA, supra note 49, at 202 (noting that national third-party candidates
with substantial backing feel tremendous pressure to bargain with one of the major
parties, and offering the example of the People's Party in 1896).
77 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 18-19 (noting that most nationally
based third parties survive only one election because they are unable to offer tangible
benefits to their supporters, and documenting that, between 1840 and 1980, of the
45 individual minor-party or independent candidates receiving presidential popular
votes in more than one state, 58% ran just once); see also Sara Fritz, Win orLose, Perot
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Legal impediments to third-party presidential candidacies
abound as well. The financial disparity between major- and minor-
party coffers exerts an undemocratic influence on electoral politics
as financially disadvantaged candidates are unable to communicate
effectively their views and may never be able to stake a claim to
legitimacy.78 This initial financial disparity is exacerbated by
federal legislation that makes it far more difficult for independent
or third-party candidates to obtain federal campaign funds than for
major parties to do so. 7 9 Ironically, these laws ensure that finan-
ChangingRules of Game, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at Al (quoting political historian
Richard Hofstadter's witticism that "[t]hird-party candidates are like bees. Once
they've stung, they die").
78 See, e.g., Bonafede, supra note 71, at 1898 (arguing that third-party candidates,
although "they had something worthwhile to say to the voters ... are denied an equal
opportunity in terms of media coverage and government campaign financing"); cf.
John M. Sylvester, Note, Equalizing Candidates' Opportunities for Expression, 51 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 113, 114 (1982) (urging congressional enactment of measures such as
public funding for congressional campaigns, lower barriers to minor parties'
qualification for public funding, and limited free access to the broadcast media for
campaign expression).
The importance of public funding can be appreciated ifone considers that in the
1992 election Clinton spent $78.8 million in tax dollars, and Bush $76.4 million. See
Campaign Cost to Us: $173.7 Million, AP, Nov. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, AP File [hereinafter Campaign Cost]. Ross Perot's reliance on his personal
wealth also shows the importance of adequate financing. See Holmes, supra note 22,
at Al ("To be sure, some of Mr. Perot's strength must be laid to his own formidable
resources ... Mr. Perot could not have done what he did without his own tens of
millions, as he would be the first to acknowledge."); Nightline (ABC television
broadcast, Oct. 1, 1992) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) ("Quite frankly, anyone with
a billion dollars could do what Ross Perot is doing.").
79 See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 84; Sylvester, supra note 78, at 127, 131 ("As
long as public financing advantages major-party candidates, it will encourage
candidates to seek a major-party nomination.").
According to the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9031-9042 (1988), in order to qualify for federal primary election matching funds,
presidential candidates must raise $100,000 in contributions from individuals, with
at least $5000 coming from contributions of no greater than $250 each from residents
in each of at least 20 states. See id. §§ 9033. Candidates must agree to spend no
more than a specified limit in each state's primary campaign. See id. § 9035(a).
Furthermore, candidates must also keep certain records, and agree to submit those
records for audit. See id. § 9033(b)(3), (4).
The most serious problems for non-major-party candidates are created by the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act,see id. §§ 9001-9013. In order tobe eligible
for general election campaign funding, minor parties must be on the ballot in at least
10 states, see id. § 9002(2), a difficult feat for underfunded minor-party campaigns.
See supra note 82-85. Minor-party candidates also must have obtained at least 5% of
the national popular vote in the preceding presidential election, an unlikely
accomplishment. 26 U.S.C. § 9002(7); see also STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1991, supra note 66, at 250 (tables 426 and 427 demonstrating the rarity of
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cial resources are least available to those candidates in direst need
of them. The resultant small campaign war chests affect the ability
of third-party or independent candidates to buy advertisements in
the broadcast and print media, and to set up even the semblance of
the far-flung campaign machines enjoyed by major-party presidential
candidates.8 0 In short, electoral funding regulations diminish the
likelihood that a minor party can significantly affect an electoral
outcome, thereby enabling the major parties to be inattentive to
minority concerns.
8 1
Ballot-access laws are an additional legal impediment confront-
ing minor-party or independent candidates. Because such laws
differ from state to state, a minor-party or independent candidate
wishing to place her name before the entire citizenry must leap fifty-
one different bureaucratic hurdles, expending valuable time, energy,
and resources while doing so.8 2 Although court decisions over the
minor-party candidates receiving more than 5% of the popular vote.) This
requirement is particularly onerous for a first-time third-party or independent
candidate, whose funding will not be forthcoming until after the election, and only
if results show that she received at least 5% of the popular vote.
Moreover, the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456, articulates
"stringent disclosure and filing requirements [that] impose a heavy burden on minor
party campaigns," Dunn, supra note 68, at 643-44; 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-34, and
contribution limits are applied without regard to major- or minor-party status. See id.
§ 441(a); ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 26 (describing FECA as "a major party
protection act").
80 For example, Lenora Fulani ran her 1988 presidential campaign with only $2.5
million, a budget smaller than that of most Senate campaigns. See Rosenthal, supra
note 57, at A23. In 1988 Fulani was on the ballot in all 50 states, and received nearly
$1 million in primary election matching funds. See Sturgess, supra note 23, at 2. In
1992, Fulani received about $2 million in primary election matching funds. See The
High Cost of Democracy; Taxpayers Fork Out $173.7 Million, Reuters, Nov. 2, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. Perot was not entitled to tax dollars
since he funded his own campaign. See id.
81 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 224.
82 See id. at 20, 24; see also Dunn, supra note 68, at 634 (noting that ballot-access
laws impose a "heavy burden on minor-party candidates [forcing them] to expend a
large portion of their scarce campaign resources on a project which is wholly
unrelated to their primary function: gaining popular support for their campaign").
Ballot access can be attained by third-party or independent candidates only if they
meet a state's requirements for collecting signatures on nominating petitions, or win
the nomination of minor political parties who have permanent ballot status in that
state or are poised to petition for a ballot position in the upcoming election, difficult
prospects to contemplate for most third-party candidates. See Fulani v. League of
Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 882 F.2d
621 (2d Cir. 1989).
The ballot-access hurdle proved surmountable to 1992 independent presidential
candidate Ross Perot, whose experience demonstratedjust how much getting on the
ballot in all 50 states and the District of Columbia in a short period of time can cost.
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past three decades have generally eased ballot-access restrictions,83
winning ballot access is still no mean feat.84 The money minor-
party candidates spend on attaining ballot access is money that
cannot be spent on advertising, voter education, and other expenses
of a successful campaign. 85 Thus, although such candidates may
be able to gain ballot access, they do so only at great cost to their
campaigns.
On a political level, third-party and independent candidates
must struggle against constant pressure from the major parties,
which seek both to delegitimize them and to co-opt their support-
ers. 86 Major parties adjust their appeals first to accommodate and
then to absorb the third parties that have emerged.8 7 The co-
Perot spent a whopping $18 million in pursuit of this accomplishment. See What Does
He Want?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1992, at 16, 16. To say that only the richest-and
rarest-of candidates could afford such a funding coup is to risk gross understate-
ment.
85 Se4 e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974) (finding portions of
California's ballot access law unconstitutional); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31
(1968) (finding that an Ohio ballot access provision violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fulani v. Krivanek, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
24723 (11th Cir., Oct. 5, 1992) (enjoining enforcement of a state statutory provision
that prohibited minor-party candidates from availing themselves of a fee-waiver
provision available to those qualifying for the ballot by petition). But see Dunn, supra
note 68, at 635 (noting that "a survey of legal challenges to ballot access laws indicates
that judicial interpretations have yielded shifting decisions").
84 New Alliance Party presidential candidate Lenora Fulani, for example, had to
amass more than 1.5 million signatures in 1988 to appear on the ballots in all 50
states and the District of Columbia. See Rosenthal, supra note 57, at A23. That feat,
Fulani claimed, qualified her as a"major minor candidate." Id. Fulani, who garnered
less than one percent of the vote in 1988, was on the ballot in 40 states in 1992. See
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, FEC APPROVES MATCHING FUNDS FOR 1992 PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES 2 (Oct. 30, 1992) [hereinafter FEC NEWS RELEASE] (news release listing
presidential candidates on the general election ballots of each state and the District
of Columbia).
8 In 1980, for example, although John Anderson eventually appeared on all 51
general election ballots, his campaign had to spend more than half of the $7.3 million
it raised in a six-month period to enable him to do so. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra
note 21, at 24. Anderson successfully challenged burdensome ballot-access laws, but
prolonged litigation drained his limited campaign resources. See Dunn, supra note
68, at 639; see also Matthew Levie, Party Pooper America v. Third Parties, NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 6, 1992, at 13, 13 (noting that the Libertarians spent $2 million
dollars, or nearly one-fourth of the party's budget, to get candidate Ron Paul on 46
state ballots in 1988).
86 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 43-45. The bright side of co-optation
is that minor-party policy innovations are brought into the political mainstream by the
major parties when those ideas either gain popularity among a significant number of
voters or threaten to erode major-party support. See supra text accompanying notes
46-52. The dark side of co-optation, however, is the threat it presents to third-party
survival. See supra text accompanying note 48.87 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 43-45; cf. FRESIA, supra note 49, at 97
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optation may even be anticipatory: major-party strategies, positions,
and even choice of nominees often predict the response of potential
third parties.88 The route for which some third-party and indepen-
dent presidential candidates have opted is to attempt to make
inroads within a major party by signing up for a primary. This
solution too is fraught with the dangers of co-optation.
89
The stranglehold the two major parties have on voters' prefer-
ences and voting patterns is also a result of socialization. Voters are
socialized into a two-party norm,90 one that is reinforced daily by
the portrayal of elections as two-party contests. 91 To vote for a
third-party candidate is not only a rejection of the two major party
candidates; it is a self-conscious breach of the loyalty to the two-
party system that is a central feature of the American voter's
political psyche.
92
Finally, the media discriminates against third parties. 93 Both
publishers and broadcasters slight minor-party candidates, deeming
("[T]he realization that alternative agendas cannot be advanced unless alternative
parties are represented compels third-party leaders to bargain with major party
leaders in the hope that a watered-down version of their agenda will be accepted in
exchange for their support.").
88 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 222.
89 Levie addresses the problem:
[Despite the fact that delegate selection rules have become more democratic
since 1968,] the outsiders are almost always devoured by the main-
stream.... Under the illusion of greater openness lies the trap of co-
optation. The Republicans still have "winner-take-all" primaries that favor
the front-runner; the Democrats still have "superdelegates" who are likely
to. Independent candidates are lured into the race only to be tripped up
in the homestretch. Furthermore, primary voters [are] mostly the party
faithful. The electorate most naturally sympathetic to an independent
candidate is excluded from voting for her.
Levie, supra note 85, at 13.
90 American party politics is commonly referred to as a two-party system, a
characterization supported by the dominance ofRepublicans and Democrats holding
office at every level of government. See Dunn, supra note 68, at 631 (urging the
relaxation of current barriers preventing "viable" minor-party candidates from
effectively participating in the American political process). Despite the entrenchment
of the current system, the institutionalization of the Democratic and Republican
parties was not constitutionally preordained. "The Constitution does not assure the
continuing existence of any particular party or guarantee that it will remain
competitive." JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 345 (1979).
91 See id. at 279 (noting that "'[tihe traditional political system' is identified
entirely with a monopoly of the two-party system"); see also infra notes 93-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the media's role in perpetuating the two-party norm).
92 See CEASAR, supra note 90, at 345.
93 See Levie, supra note 85, at 13 (noting that the media focuses on "big" names
and gives the upstarts short shrift).
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them unworthy of the attention given major-party candidates;94 at
times the press even displays an overt hostility to third-party candi-
dates.95  This result is particularly destructive to a third-party
candidacy, for media coverage is an essential component of a
successful campaign.96 It supplies the candidate with legitimacy
and name recognition, which are both necessary to attract votes.
9 7
The media exposure major-party candidates receive is an emolument
of their status, amounting to a campaign subsidy.98 Media apathy
begets a lack of voter awareness: "The political obscurity of most
minor party candidates, their inability to publicize themselves as
major party contenders can, and their neglect by the media mean
that many voters simply do not have information on these candi-
dates."
99
94 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 85 ("Nearly two out of three
newspaper editors thought that their readers had little interest in third-party
candidates in 1980.").
95 For example, the media initially extolled independent candidate John
Anderson's 1980 bid for the presidency but turned against him when it became
evident he could not win. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 33-34; cf. Jim
Squires, A Collision Made in Heaven, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1992, at 29,29 (former Perot
advisor characterizing the media's coverage of Perot as vindictive, and arguing that
"[tihe consensus of talking heads and pundit pens [was] that.. . Perot [repeatedly]
demonstrated temperament that disqualifies him from holding the nation's highest
office").
96 See Gregory P. Magarian, Fighting Exclusion From Televised Presidential Debates:
Minor-Party Candidates' Standing to Challenge Sponsoring Organizations' Tax-Exempt
Status, 90 MICH. L. REV. 838,874 (noting that the mass media dominates many critical
processes of elections, including setting agendas, legitimizing candidates, and
determining candidates' public images).97 See Dunn, supra note 68, at 649 (noting that "[w]ithout sufficient media
coverage, it is difficult if not impossible for minor party candidates to achieve the
necessary degree of legitimacy" and that coverage of minor-party candidates by the
media would beget further coverage, thereby diminishing their anonymity and
fomenting increased public perception of them as "legitimate" candidates).
98 Substantial media exposure is lavished upon major-party candidates at the
expense of minor-party candidates. See Dunn, supra note 68, at 649 (stating that the
alignment of most Americans with one of the two major parties is often deemed
"sufficientjustification for the news organizations' focus on major party candidates
and neglect of minor party candidates").
99 ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 38. Television coverage might be the
most important form of media exposure in a presidential campaign, and the
importance of television to a successful candidacy cannot be overestimated.
"American politics and television are now so completely locked together that it is
impossible to tell the story of one without the other." THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA
IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1956-1980, at 165 (1982).
Television has quite simply become "the dominant medium of political communi-
cation in the United States." See Dunn, supra note 68, at 647. Cf. Ronald K. L.
Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L.
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The myriad barriers, impediments, and constraints which
confront third parties have thrust them into an ongoing crisis of
legitimacy and have made "voting for a third party an act requiring
unusual energy, persistence and desperation." 0 0 Third parties
are trapped in a cycle of discouragement and futility, deemed
unimportant because they receive little support or press coverage,
and receiving little support or press coverage because they are
deemed unimportant.
10 1
REV. 1087, 1101 (1990) (lamenting the ascendancy of television's "sound-bite
discourse" in presidential campaigns).
Third-party and independent candidates are uniquely vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of television coverage. See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 84 (arguing that
exclusion from equal time on television "threatens to obliterate [third-party
candidacies] entirely"). In 1960, for example, after Congress temporarily suspended
the "equal time" law and made it lawful for broadcasters to provide time to the two
major-party candidates while excluding other candidates, the amount of time made
available to minor-party candidates plunged by more than 90% from the levels of the
preceding election. See id. Suspension of the equal time provision legitimized
exclusion of minor-party candidates from the 1960 debates. See Dunn, supra note 68,
at 651. Third parties like the Progressives may have flourished before the advent of
television, but television has transformed politics. "Television viability [has become]
the viability that matters. Television is American politics in the way that television is
American sports." Robert MacNeil, Has Television Cast a Spell Over Politics?, TV
GUIDE, June 28, 1980, at 5, 5.
The effect of this media bias is most dramatic in the context of televised debates:
"'The two big parties have a monopoly on the media,'. . . and the debates, broadcast
by all the networks, are the biggest media event." Ann Cooper, Tuning in on the Other
200 Presidential Hopefuls, NAT'LJ., Oct. 6, 1984, at 1885 (quoting SoniaJohnson, 1984
presidential candidate of the Citizens Party). Exclusion of minor-party candidates is
not an oversight. Since 1976, debates have not been subject to the "equal opportuni-
ty requirement" of the Federal Communications Act, which required broadcasters
providing time to one candidate for a public office to afford equal time to all other
candidates. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 35. Since the debates have
been deemed exempt from the Act as "bona fide news events," the networks have no
obligation to provide any free time for excluded third-party or independent
candidates. See id. Additionally, the FCC has eliminated the Fairness Doctrine, which
required broadcast media licensees to provide "a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints on ... issues." Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC,
867 F.2d 654, 655-57 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing the FCC's inquiry into the fairness
and the wisdom of the doctrine, and its ultimate conclusion that the Fairness Doctrine
"as a matter of policy, disserves the public interest"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019
(1990).
100 ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 27.
101 One writer has aptly summarized this effect:
Because citizens know third parties have very little chance of winning, they
prefer not to waste their votes on them. Small parties become discouraged
and either drop out or join with another party. At the same time, the
system encourages the two major parties to try to absorb minor parties or
prevent them from flourishing in the first place.
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The following section discusses how the exclusion of significant
third-party and independent candidates from televised presidential
debates compounds the already considerable obstacles that these
contenders face, and prevents the debates from achieving their
potential to perform a host of useful roles, not the least of which
are informing the public, focusing attention on the election, and
galvanizing voter participation. The inclusion of such candidates
will make for better third parties and better debates. In both cases,
the electorate will be the principal beneficiary.
III. THE HARMS OF EXCLUSION AND THE
MERITS OF INCLUSION
A. The Harms Of Exclusion
If you're not on the debates, you're dead meat.
102
Exclusion from a televised presidential debate-perhaps the
single most important opportunity for a candidate to reach the
votersl-is a paralyzing blow to the efforts of third parties to
fulfill their crucial role. Excluded candidates are indeed "dead
meat," but not because exclusion is the coup de grace to their
already meager hopes for electoral success. Rather, in an age when
political significance and legitimacy are predicated largely upon
television exposure, third-party and independent presidential
candidates barred from televised debates have scant opportunity to
bring alternative viewpoints to the public light, 10 4 or to foil inces-
ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 16; see also id. at 39 ("Third party candidates
also do poorly because most people think they will do poorly"). The fact that nearly
60% of all minor-party presidential candidates never run again a second time is thus
unsurprising. Id. at 18; see also Dunn, supra note 68, at 649 (arguing that denying a
campaign visibility "leads to a decrease in legitimacy, dwindling campaign contribu-
tions and ultimately obsolescence").
102 Wendy Zentz, Feminist Candidate Loses Debate Bid, UPI, Sept. 23, 1987, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (quotingJohn Armor, attorney for 1984 minor-
party presidential candidate SoniaJohnson).
103 See Thomas E. Patterson, Television and Presidential Politics: A Proposal to
Restructure Television Communication, in ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN PRESIDENTIAL
SELECTION 303 (A. Heard & M. Nelson eds., 1987).
104 In contrast, Perot's multi-million dollar television advertising blitz and his
repeated appearances on televised talk shows would have permitted his message to
emerge, even had he been excluded from the debates. See, e.g., The Second Coming,
NEWSWEEK, Nov./Dec. 1992 (Special Election Issue), at 86, 87 (noting that since
Perot's medium was "all but exclusively paid television ... he had more to spend on
media than Bush and Clinton combined."); Superhero, NEWSWEEK, Nov./Dec. 1992
(Special Election Issue), at 70, 72 (noting Perot's preference for "for talk radio and
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sant major-party endeavors to manipulate the presentation of issues
and views to the public. If the significance of minor parties inheres
in their ability to alter the political agenda and the distribution of
major-party support, to assure major-party accountability while
encouraging voter participation, and to perform key symbolic
functions, 10 5 they can best fulfill these roles with a presence in
the presidential debate, the Super Bowl of politics.
Exclusion of third parties from debates frustrates this ideal in
several ways. First, exclusion is tantamount to delegitimization 1 0 6
Debates "enhance support for the political system by legitimizing
both nominees." 10 7 The negative implication of this proposition
is that a candidate not on the debates cannot be legitimized. Absent
legitimization-to say nothing of support-third parties will remain
distant voices in the wilderness, unable to influence the political
agenda, raise important yet overlooked issues, or hold the major
parties accountable.10 8 Delegitimization, of course, is yet another
blow to the weak electoral credibility currently enjoyed by third-
party and independent candidates.
The absence of minor-party candidates from televised presiden-
tial debates also divests third-party supporters of the symbolic sense
of participation in American politics. Debates have a communal
importance, binding the electorate to the elected, imbuing viewers
with a sense-even if not altogether warranted-of participation in a
TV, especially call-in shows"). Few third-party or independent candidates, however,
have either the funds or the opportunities to present their views to the voting public.
See supra notes 78-81. A debate appearance thus takes on increased importance.
1° See supra Part I.
106 Because third parties are seen as disrupters of the two-party system, their first
task is establishing their legitimacy, something not required of the major parties. See
ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 39. A minor party's inherently precarious
position makes it particularly susceptible to delegitimization by a wide variety of
means, including exclusion from debates. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying
text. Ross Perot exemplifies the legitimizing force of a good debate performance.
See Fineman, supra note 73, at 47 (claiming that the debates "launched Perot");
Howard Fineman, Face to Face to Face, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1992, at 20 (noting that
a Newsweek poll found that a plurality (43%) of viewers thought Perot won the first
debate); Firestone, supra note 31 at 29 (noting that Perot's impressive debate
performance buoyed his campaign); Only One AnswerDeep, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 13,1992,
at A22 (noting that Perot's strong performance on the debates "probably tempted
many listeners to consider his candidacy afresh").
107 LANOUE & SCHROTT, supra note 5, at 105 (emphasis omitted).
108 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 222 ("Minor parties are not so much
safety valves for voters who want to blow off steam as they are checks on the major
parties. They are a weapon citizens can use to force the major parties to be more
accountable.")
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national process.1 0 9 If one's candidate is not seen discussing the
important issues of the day in a preeminent national forum, the
result is a sense of disenfranchisement that may find expression in
political nihilism and ultimately lead to withdrawal from the
political process. Inclusion of significant third-party candidates, on
the other hand, signifies to their supporters that such candidates
matter. Third-party debate participation is an important symbolic
step toward the democratization of presidential politics. Inclusion
of such candidates would give minor-party candidates "the opportu-
nity to overcome the widespread attitude that third-party candida-
cies are a waste of time."
11 0
B. The Merits of Inclusion
[Additional third-party candidates] should have been on stage with
President Bush, Gov. Bill Clinton and Perot in their three debates. The
quality of discussion could only have risen. [These alternate candidates]
were labeled minor candidates, despite some of their ideas being innovative
and many of the major candidates' ideas being bland."'
A third-party presence in debates would accelerate the co-
optation effect,1 1 2 thereby increasing minor-party ability to influ-
ence the political agenda. A policy innovation espoused by a
significant minor-party or independent candidate in a nationally
televised debate is instantly broadcast to millions of American
homes. Polls demonstrate the electorate's response to such propos-
als. If the response is sufficiently positive, political realities dictate
that the two major candidates will jockey for primacy in assimilating
the minor-party or independent candidate's ideas and support. If
non-major-party nominees were included in debates, politically
109 This political participation rationale for third-party candidate inclusion in
debates derives from the notion "[t]hat politics can be an enriching experience
separate from assessments of 'victory' or 'defeat.'" FRESIA, supra note 49, at 25-26;
see also id. at 214 ("[W]e are engaged in politics because to express an idea, or to
reflect upon oneself, or to think honestly and publicly is in itself worthwhile and
satisfying."); cf. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 5 ("[P]ast debates were informative and...
stimulated voter interest."); Magarian, supra note 96, at 877 (noting the argument that
debates build confidence in American democracy).
110 Barmann, supra note 16, at 453; see also supra text accompanying notes 55 &
70.
111 Colman McCarthy, The Candidates Who Were Not Heard, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
1992, at CIO ("The two major parties offer centrist and conventional strategies
because, it is believed, most of the votes are in the middle. But how do we know if
the outer edges are not given a place?").
112 See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
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viable ideas that are important to Americans but have not found a
voice in major-party platforms would more quickly wend their way
into the political mainstream.
Second, a third-party candidate's presence would reduce the
ability of the major parties to collude with each other in the
manipulation of the debates. As currently structured, the televised
presidential debates, especially the decision whether to debate and
under what conditions, "epitomize the game of power and partisan-
ship."11 3 This manipulation was brought into sharp relief in 1988,
when the League of Women Voters responded to it by withdrawing
as a debate sponsor.
114
Major-party orchestration of when, how, and whether to debate
continued in the 1992 presidential race, particularly on the part of
H3 Debates and Public Service, CHRISTIAN SC. MONIToR, July 9, 1987, at 15.
114 A sponsor of most of the televised presidential debates since 1976, the League
of Women Voters withdrew its sponsorship of the second 1988 presidential debate,
denouncing the rigidly choreographed debate format as both a "fraud" and "an
attempt to hoodwink the American public." Stephen Knight, United States: Debate
Sponsor Pulls Out Citing 'Fraud, " Inter Press Serv., Oct. 5, 1988, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File. League President Nancy Neuman charged that "the
candidates' organizations aim to add debates to their list of campaign-trail charades
devoid of substance, spontaneity and honest answers to tough questions." Id. A 16-
page memorandum detailing the format of the debate, ajoint effort of the Bush and
Dukakis campaigns, drew particular fire from Neuman, who called it a "closed-door
masterpiece," noting that the League was told to "take it or leave it." Id. Additional-
ly, League Communications Director Stephanie Drea reported that the Bush
campaign demanded a telephone connection to the debate's producer so that
substantive changes could be made while the show was on the air, a gambit that had
been used to shift the focus of the first Bush-Dukakis debate to foreign policy. Id.
The gap in sponsorship created by the resignation of the League was quickly
filled by the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD), a bipartisan group that had
sponsored the first debate and was formed in 1987 by the Republican and Democratic
national committees. See Mike Mills, Parties to Sponsor Debates in '88; Voters League
Upset, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1987, at 13. The League of Women Voters has long
believed that party-sponsored debates inevitably give short-shrift to minor-party
candidates seeking inclusion. See id.; Knight, supra. The CPD acknowledged that it
considered its "primary responsibility [to be] with the two major parties," although
the Commission stated that it would not rule out including viable third-party
candidates. See Mills, supra, at 16; cf Who'll Protect theJohn Andersons?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1985, at A30 (expressing concern that the interests of independents and
third-party candidates might not be protected in debates sponsored by the major
parties).
No third-party candidates were included in the 1988 general election debates
sponsored by the CPD or in the three primary season debates sponsored by the
League. See Barmann, supra note 16, at 452. Though Ross Perot participated in the
three 1992 presidential debates, the circumstances of his inclusion were redolent of
a bilateral decision by the Bush and Clinton campaigns rather than an independent
CPD determination. See infra note 225.
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the Bush campaign." 5 Moreover, the decision to include Ross
Perot appeared to be driven by a common Democratic and
Republican view that an independent candidate's presence would
help one side and hinder the other.116  As long as third-party
participation is dictated by Democratic and Republican perceptions
of political expediency, the two major parties will be able to
continue their monopolistic hold on every aspect of the debates, a
circumstance that will prevent the debates from ever fulfilling the
potential they hold for informing the electorate.
Third, an independent or minor-party candidate's presence in
debates stimulates voter interest.1 1 7 The 1992 debates, the first
ever in which the two major-party candidates simultaneously
debated a third-party candidate, drew the largest debate audiences
in the history of the event.11 8 A fair inference is that increased
interest in the debates was attributable, in large part, to the
presence of Ross Perot, a significant independent candidate.
11 9
Finally, a third-party candidate's presence in the debates would
function as a wild card, lending the debates an element of unpre-
dictability. Unpredictability, of course, necessitates increased
preparation on the part of the candidates, and increased prepara-
tion spells "better" debates. Better because a minor-party or
115 Only after months of posturing followed by two days of heated meetings
involving representatives of both campaigns did the two sides finally strike a deal
about format. See Cohen, supra note 22 (stating that "Bush finally made a move after
his obdurate opposition to the format, suggested by a bipartisan commission, caused
cancellation of the first three scheduled meetings with Clinton"); see also Tom Baxter,
Candidates Face Each Other Tonight: First Debate Called Crucial, ATLANTA CONST., Oct.
11, 1992, at Al (suggesting that the Bush campaign might have "outsmarted itself"
by resisting earlier debate proposals and holding out until after Perot reentered the
race);infra note 226.
ii6 See Howard Fineman, Mixinglt Up-Again, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 12, 1992, at 26, 27
("With each side hoping that Perot would do more damage to the other, the two
camps crossed their fingers and invited him to share the stage."). The Republicans
viewed Perot's presence as a plus to President Bush, who they felt would look more
"presidential" with two challengers simultaneously attacking him; the Clinton camp
may have wanted Perot on the debates because his presence could have diffused a
Bush attack. See Baxter, supra note 115, at Al (discussing the tactical advantages both
sides hoped to gain through Perot's participation in the debates).
117 See Barmann, supra note 16, at 453.
1s See Kubasik, supra note 5, at 20 (reporting that the third debate was "the
second-most-watched such TV event ever-behind [only the previous] debate.");
Arthur Spiegelman, It Was Supposed to be an Election Nobody Cared About, Reuters, Oct.
22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (noting that the debates "won
the kind of ratings usually reserved for major sporting events").
119 See e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 118 (noting that experts credit Ross Perot with
"helping to rewaken the sleeping giant of the American electorate").
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independent candidate's participation would result in a fuller
political dialogue. Better because the two major parties would be
less able to restrict the subjects of discourse, and might in fact be
forced to confront important public issues they otherwise would
not. And better because, with candidates more prepared, with more
issues discussed, and with the solicitation of a third point of view,
the debates would simply be more informative. Since debates serve
"the ideal of informing the public,"120 this result is in the best
interests of all. In summary, exclusion from presidential debates is
yet another restriction on third-party and independent candidates,
a restriction to be decried because any such limitations on the
"political effectiveness" of a group "threaten to reduce diversity and
competition in the marketplace of ideas."
121
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Having discussed the importance of a third-party or independent
candidate's presence in the nationally televised debates, this Com-
ment now examines several recent cases in which third-party
candidates have sought inclusion in such arenas. This section will
discuss the general lack ofjudicial solicitude to the plight of third-
party candidates seeking inclusion on nationally televised presiden-
tial debates, and then conclude that judicial fiat is an impractical
mechanism for insuring participation of third-party or independent
candidates.
The federal judiciary has rejected a constitutional assault on
exclusion of such a candidate from televised debates. In Johnson v.
FCC, 122 the D.C. Circuit unanimously affirmed the FCC's denial
of a third-party candidate's complaint which sought to prohibit the
broadcast of the 1984 presidential and vice-presidential debates
unless she and her running-mate were included. 123 The court
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the debates "had become so
institutionalized as to be a prerequisite for election" and that the
plaintiffs' exclusion thus restricted their access to the ballot and
impinged upon associational choices protected by the First
120 Earl W. Foell, New, Improved Presidential Debates: Planning Now for '88,
CHRISTIAN SC:. MONITOR, Apr. 2, 1985, at 3, 3.
121 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983) (finding that "the primary
values protected by the First Amendment ... are served when election campaigns are
not monopolized by the existing political parties").
122 829 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
123 See id. at 160.
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Amendment.124  It reasoned that "the broadcast access cases
decided under the First Amendment [and on which plaintiffs relied]
do not support [their] claims to be included in the televised de-
bates."
125
While recognizing the plaintiffs' fear "that the voices of minor-
party candidates may be drowned out by the superior financial
resources of the major parties, or encounter discrimination from
conscious or unconscious biases of large broadcasters," 126 the
court nonetheless concluded that this concern was met by "the
several access provisions of the Communications Act [that] ensure
that political debate will not be monopolized by one of a very few
candidates." 127 In addition, the court explained, the petitioners
sought not general access, but the specific right to appear on a
specific program sponsored by a specific organization.128 Grant-
ing such a right, the court concluded, would contravene the "First
Amendment balance struck in the statutory scheme" 129 and would
raise the specter of increasing "'Government control over the
content of broadcast discussion of public issues.'
s13 0
The political naivet6 the Johnson court demonstrated by failing
to appreciate the enormous impact of the debates is trouble-
124 Id. at 159.
12 Id. at 164. As for the plaintiffs' claim that the Communications Act and
judicial precedent mandated inclusion, the court held: "[Tlhe Commission properly
determined that petitioners had no right recognized by the Communications Act or
the broadcast-access precedents to be included in the televised debates." Id. at 158.
The Johnson court relied, in part, on Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (upholding a ban on editorial advertising imposed by
broadcast licensees, while rejecting Fairness Doctrine and First Amendment
challenges, since access claims must be examined in light of the regulatory scheme
that has evolved from the Communications Act). Congress has chosen to protect the
public's First Amendment rights to broadcasting, the D.C. Circuit noted, "'by relying
on broadcasters as public trustees, periodically accountable for their stewardship, to
use their discretion in ensuring the public's access to conflicting ideas.'" Johnson, 829
F.2d at 162 (quoting Respondent's Brief, Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636
F.2d 417, 432 (1980) (No. 80-1482)).
126johnson, 829 F.2d at 161.
127 Id. The D.C. Circuit also relied on, but did not critically reexamine, its earlier
decision in Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding debates between
qualified political candidates initiated by nonbroadcast entities to be "bona fide news
events" and thus exempt from the equal opportunity requirements of § 315(a) of the
Communications Act), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). The decision made possible
all subsequent debates. SeeJAMIESON & BIRDSELL, supra note 8, at app. 2.
128 See Johnson, 829 F.2d at 162.
129 Id.
130 Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 126 (1973)).
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some.13 1 The court did recognize that inclusion of the appellants
in the debates "undoubtedly would have benefitted their campaign." 
1 3 2
At the same time, however, the D.C. Circuit refused to equate
exclusion from the debates with exclusion from the ballot, explain-
ing: "[t]he former removes only one of the great number of
avenues for candidates to gain publicity and credibility with the
citizenry, while the latter drastically restricts voters' ability to choose
the omitted candidate."133  Yet the televised presidential debate
is an event of such political magnitude that it is not merely "one of
a great number of avenues" for the attainment of credibility and
publicity; it is the avenue.1 3 4 By claiming that exclusion from the
debates did not prevent the petitioner from "waging an effective
campaign, " 135 the court additionally demonstrated a judicial
myopia common to opinions in this area: the belief that exclusion
from nationally televised presidential debates does not pose a
substantial obstacle to a significant non-major party candidate.
Displaying limited recognition of the debates' import, the court
also explained that the Constitution is not an instrument for
insuring that all candidates are equal in terms of financial strength
and publicity, and does not mean to aid in "overcoming disadvan-
tages in money and image frequently encountered by minor-party
candidates." 13 6 Given the Johnson decision, as well as the mixed
results of other challenges by third-party plaintiffs to various
exclusionary electoral procedures,1 3 7 a bare constitutional claim
for inclusion of third-party or independent candidates in televised
presidential debates would seem to harbor dismal prospects of
success. For one third-party candidate, however, the statutory arena
seemed to offer a more promising avenue of judicial attack.
131 The "significance" of Johnson's candidacy was questionable, however.
AlthoughJohnson and her Citizens Party running mate appeared on 19 state ballots
and came in fifth place in the 1984 national presidential race, the two garnered only
.08% of the vote. See Johnson, 829 F.2d at 158-59; see also Zentz, supra note 102.
132Johnson, 829 F.2d at 165.
133 Id. at 164-65. But see infra text accompanying note 146.
134 See supra note 99.
135Johnson, 829 F.2d at 165.
136 Id.
137 Compare e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (finding a state's
early filing deadline for minor-party candidates constitutionally infirm) with Chandler
v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a public television station's decision not to include third-party candidates in
televised debates does not violate the Constitution). For ballot-access cases in which
the Supreme Court has found a state law unconstitutional, see supra note 83.
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In Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 13 8 presidential
candidate Lenora Fulani brought a statutorily based third-party
challenge to her exclusion from the presidential debates before the
Second Circuit. Using the theory of competitive advocate standing
to allege redressable harm,139 Fulani contended that the League
of Women Voters, the sponsor of the primary debates, had engaged
in "partisan" activity when it refused to allow her to participate in
the 1988 Democratic and Republican primary debates. 140 Accord-
ingly, she claimed, the League's tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code, granted to organizations operated in
a nonpartisan manner and exclusively for charitable or educational
purposes, should be revoked. 141 Without such tax-exempt status,
a Federal Election Commission regulation would have prevented the
League from sponsoring the debate.
142
Although the Second Circuit held that Fulani satisfied the
applicable standing requirements to litigate the League's tax-exempt
status, 143 the court concluded that Fulani's claim failed on the
merits, since the League's exclusion of Fulani from the primary
138 Fulani I, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
139 See id. at 625. Under the competitive advocate standing theory, also known as
the competitive political advocate theory and the competitive political advantage
theory, a complainant can "satisfy the Constitution's case or controversy requirement
by alleging that discriminatory enforcement of a statute grants an unfair advantage
to a political competitor which thereby diminishes the plaintiffs' ability to compete
effectively in the political arena." Jordana G. Schwartz, Note; Standing to Challenge
Tax.Exempt Status: The Second Circuit's Competitive Political Advocate Theory, 58
FoRDHAM L. REV. 723, 723 (1990). See generally Magarian, supra note 96 at 855-67
(comparing the Second Circuit's approach to the competitive advocate standing
theory to that of the D.C. Circuit).14 See Fulani I, 882 F.2d at 623.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 627-28 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a)(1) (1988) which provides in
pertinent part that a "non-profit organization... exempt from federal taxation under
26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) ... and which does not endorse, support or oppose political
candidates or political parties may stage nonpartisan candidate debates").
143 See id. at 628. To have standing to sue, one must prove: (1) a "personal
injury" that is (2) "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct" and
(3) that requested relief is likely to redress. Id. at 624 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). "But for the government's refusal to revoke the League's tax-
exempt status," the court held, "the League, as a practical matter, would have been
unable to sponsor the allegedly partisan debates which caused the injury of which
Fulani complains." Id. at 628. Several commentators have agreed that in granting
Fulani standing, the Fulani I court properly applied the standing doctrine. See
Magarian, supra note 96, at 855 ("[A] candidate should have standing to challenge
debate sponsors' tax status .... ."); Schwartz, supra note 139, at 737 ("[C]ompetitive
advocate standing was properly applied by the court in [Fulani 1]").
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debates, "intra-party competitions," did not constitute impermissible
"partisan" activity.144  Fulani, the court noted, "was neither a
candidate nor a participant" in either of the primaries that were the
subject of the League's voter education program, and so she was
properly excluded.
1 45
The Second Circuit's opinion on the merits has been convincing-
ly criticized by at least one commentator, who urges that the court
botched the doctrinal analysis by
fail[ing] to recognize that at all stages of a campaign, the major
parties compete against each other, and third-party candidates
compete against the major-party candidates. The court's concep-
tion of the primary season as "intra-party" competitions fails to
recognize that the ballot qualification process pits all parties
against each other even during the primary season.
1 46
The court's narrow view of the impact of debates, in fact, was
reminiscent of the D.C. Circuit's characterization of these events in
Johnson v. FCC.
14 7
Despite this cramped view of "competition," the court's opinion
at least left open the possibility, indeed suggested, that in a general
election debate, a different standard of participation might obtain.
The court stressed that "[i]t is of critical importance that the ...
debates were not general election debates. Rather, they were primary
season debates .... "148 The dictum continues in this remarkable
vein, an unambiguous judicial recognition of the significance of
debates, and a corresponding judicial sensitivity to the competitive
disadvantage wrought by exclusion:
In this era of modern telecommunications, who could doubt the
powerful beneficial effect that mass media exposure can have
today on the candidacy of a significant aspirant seeking national
political office. The debates sponsored by the League were
broadcast on national television, watched by millions of Ameri-
cans, and widely covered by the media. It is beyond dispute that
participation in these debates bestowed on the candidates who
144 See Fulani I, 882 F.2d at 628-30.
145 Id. at 630.
146 Barmann, supra note 16, at 462 (citation omitted).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
148 Fulani , 882 F.2d at 629; see also Sturgess, supra note 23, at 2 ("The ruling
leaves open the possibility that in a general election, a different standard of
participation would apply.").
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appeared in them some competitive advantage over their non-
participating peers.
149
The competitive disadvantage confronting Fulani, the court noted,
"palpably impaired her ability to compete on an equal footing with
other significant presidential candidates," and thus constituted
sufficient "injury" for standing purposes.1 50 This solicitous rheto-
ric, however, proved to be cold comfort, for it did not affect the
court's conclusion that the League's behavior was not "parti-
san".
151
Although the competitive advocate standing theory seemed to
hold promise for a third-party candidate seeking a slot on a
nationally televised presidential debate, the doctrine proved
unavailing when Fulani relied on it to sue the 1992 presidential
debate sponsor, the Commission on Presidential Debates, in the
D.C. Circuit.1 52 The procedural posture of Fulani II was identical
to that of Fulani I, except that Fulani sought inclusion in the
nationally televised presidential debates rather than in the primary
debates. However, the D.C. Circuit held that Fulani lacked standing
to challenge the tax-exempt status of the CPD. 153 In disagreeing
with the Second Circuit's competitive advocate standing analysis, the
D.C. Circuit found the CPD's tax-exempt status to be an indirect
cause of Fulani's alleged injury; the court viewed both the FEC
regulation and the CPD's sponsorship of the debates as among the
intervening causal agents that rendered the injury not fairly
traceable to the CPD's tax-exempt status.1 54 The court's opinion
was strikingly formalistic, bereft of the Second Circuit's explicit
understanding of both the importance of the televised debates and
the grave impact of exclusion from such fora on third-party
candidates. Additionally, the majority's standing analysis was
149 Fulani I, 882 F.2d at 626.
.50 Id. The majority described the injury as the "partisan restriction of [Fulani's]
opportunities to communicate her political ideas to the voting public at large." Id.
at 627.
151 Id. at 630.
152 See Fulani II, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992).
153 See id. at 1325.
154 See id. at 1329 ("[W]hile the IRS's decision to provide the CPD with tax-exempt
status is a cause of Fulani's claimed injury, it is merely one in a chain of independent
causal factors necessary to achieve this injury.").
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persuasively criticized by Judge Mikva in dissent15 5 and by several
commentators.
156
Fulani H seemed to spell doom for the future of suits by third-
party or independent candidates seeking inclusion in televised
debates. Such plaintiffs, after all, had now been convincingly
defeated in federal courts of appeal on both constitutional and
statutory grounds. In October of 1992, however, Fulani dutifully
followed the Second Circuit's Fulani I cue, 157 bringing suit in the
Southern District of New York against the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service for their
"alleged failure to enforce the non-electioneering prohibitions" of
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code by not mandating her
inclusion in the televised general election presidential debates.
1 58
155 See id. at 1331 (Mikva, J., dissenting). First, Mikva asserted that the majority
paid "only lip service" to the injury alleged by the appellants, the gist of which was
that Fulani's credibility as a "spoiler" and public advocate was undermined by her
absence from the debates, and that allowing two major-party candidates to debate
only each other unfairly boosted their campaigns relative to hers. Id. at 1331-32
(Mikva, J., dissenting). In agreeing with the competitive advocate standing theory
espoused by the Second Circuit in Fulani I, Mikva criticized the majority for "[failing]
to come to terms with Fulani's injury." Id. at 1333 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
Second, Mikva argued, the majority botched its traceability analysis by ignoring
precedent, which mandated that the "presence of intervening actors in a chain of
events that leads from the alleged legal violation to the alleged harm will not
necessarily defeat standing." Id. at 1333 (Mikva,J., dissenting). Third, Mikva noted
that the majority had misapplied redressability requirements in holding that there was
not a "substantial likelihood" that Fulani's injury would be redressed by a favorable
decision on the merits, since the CPD, faced with the choice of opening its debates
to more candidates or losing its tax exemption, might simply decide not to sponsor
presidential debates at all. Id. at 1335 (MikvaJ., dissenting). Fulani's claim, Mikva
concluded, raised the possibility that Congress had "tilt[ed] the electoral playing field
.... I therefore dissent from a decision that insulates from review federal complicity
in keeping minor political parties off the national stage." Id. at 1337 (Mikva, J.,
dissenting).
156 See Magarian, supra note 96, at 884-85 (arguing that the Second Circuit's
"recognition of the breadth and depth of the injuries which exclusion from televised
debates caused Fulani create[s] a compelling foundation for standing" that has
support in current Supreme Court standing doctrine); Schwartz, supra note 139, at
736 (arguing that the competitive advocate standing theory "has strong antecedents
in cases holding that economic and political competitors may allege injury sufficient
to confer standing"). Additionally, "political scientists' findings about minority-party
candidates' roles in the American electoral system bolster.. .justifications ... to find
standing...." Magarian, supra note 96, at 867. In fact, it is no overstatement to
claim that "[a]s the government becomes increasingly involved in regulating the
political process, the likelihood that some political participants will glean advantages
at the expense of others is increased." Schwartz, supra note 139, at 736 n.106.
157 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
158 Fulani III, No. 92 Civ. 7182 (SWK), slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1992).
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Fulani sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction revoking or suspending the CPD's tax-exempt status
unless the organization (a) included her in the debates or (b)
withdrew its sponsorship of the debates. 159 The court denied
Fulani's request for preliminary injunctive relief, holding that she
failed to make the strong showing required for such relief.
160
The district court did note, however, that Fulani "[had raised]
important issues which will be determined in the course of this
litigation."161 Fulani's latest judicial salvo, however, may be a
misfire: as the district court suggested in dictum, it may never have
to reach the merits of her suit because her claims may be barred by
the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a result of the D.C. Circuit's
earlier opinion in Fulani I, and the suit may be dismissed due to
Fulani's failure to join an indispensable party, the CPD.162
In summary, the recentjudicial response to third-party candida-
tes' petitions for inclusion on televised debates has been tepid at
best. The D.C. Circuit has both dismissed a constitutionally based
appeal and rejected the competitive advocate standing theory as a
basis for minor-party candidates to seek inclusion in the debates or
revocation of the debate sponsor's tax-exempt status. Although the
Second Circuit seems sympathetic to the competitive advocate
standing theory, the procedural posture of the current suit against
the heads of the Treasury and the IRS renders it unlikely that the
Second Circuit will ever reach the merits. 163 Finally, the Supreme
Court, by denying certiorari in Fulani II, has indicated present
unwillingness to resolve the circuit split about the competitive
advocate standing theory.164 A survey of the judicial landscape,
then, indicates that the courts are not soon likely to grant third-
party candidates relief.
Even if the judicial treatment of minor-party candidates seeking
inclusion in nationally televised presidential debates were more
solicitous than it has been-and despite the strong competitive
159 See id. at 2. In the alternative, Fulani demanded that the CPD adhere to its
published selection criteria by revoking its invitation to Perot to participate in the
debates. See id.
160 See id. at 3.
161 Id.
162 See id. at 4-5.
163 Even if the Second Circuit did find that Fulani's latest case should be heard on
the merits, its earlier dictum would not be binding, so one can only speculate on how
the court would pass on a claim by a third-party or independent candidate who
sought to participate in the presidential, rather than the primary, debates.
16 See Fulani II, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992).
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advocate standing claim that a significant third-party or independent
candidate could make-the judiciary is not the appropriate body to
grant relief to such candidates. 165 Judicially mandated inclusion
would likely be a simplistic, narrow, fact-specific determination that
would not concern itself with the necessarily complex, fine-tuned
political judgments that need to be made. Such inclusion would
likely encourage a spate of lawsuits by third-party or independent
candidates of varying national stature, each claiming to be similarly
situated to a candidate who has already been granted judicial relief.
Which third-party or independent candidates should be included
in the debates? Certainly, practical considerations dictate that
allowing dozens of fringe candidates to participate in a nationally
televised debate with the two major candidates is neither wise nor
predictable. 166 What realistic criteria can be formulated to deter-
mine which third-party or independent candidates to include and
which to exclude? How can one be certain that the major parties
will agree to participate in such debates? The task of answering
these and similar questions, of ironing out solutions to political
problems, is a job for which the legislature is uniquely qualified.
Only Congress has the time, the resources, and the knowledge to
restructure, in programmatic fashion, nationally televised debates.
This Comment will now examine and evaluate three current
legislative proposals that would reform the debate process by
institutionalizing the debates. After analyzing all three proposals,
this Comment will urge the adoption of the third, the best hope for
assuring that the electorate can enjoy the merits of legislative
inclusion.
165 But see Magarian, supra note 96, at 885 (contending that "[u]njust and
unnecessary political discrimination against minor-party candidates creates a breach
into which the independent judiciary is ideally suited to step").
166 Twenty-three candidates were listed by the FEC in its compilation of
presidential candidates on the 1992 general election ballots of each state and the
District of Columbia. See FEC NEws RELFASE, supra note 84, at 1-3. In the 1988
election, there were 168 declared candidates for the office of the presidency, though
not all were on the ballot. See Dunn, supra note 68, at 649.
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V. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A. The Constitutionality of Institutionalizing Debates
Institutionalizing presidential debates by conditioning eligibility
for federal campaign fund payments on candidate participation in
debates has been a controversial notion. 167 Some commentators
have questioned the constitutionality of institutionalized de-
bates, 168 others the wisdom of them.1 69 Yet institutionalization
has drawn strong support. 170 Supporters of institutionalization
167 The debates themselves, regular features of the last five elections, seem to have
become firmly entrenched. See John Omicinski, Presidential Debates Made for Good
Television, Gannett News Serv., Oct. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File (assessing impact of the high ratings of the 1992 debates on the future of
presidential debates). Yet the major parties' inveterate haggling over debates and
gamesmanship about whether to participate, see supra notes 113-16 and accompanying
text, indicate that the debates have not yet become a sine qua non of presidential
races.
168 See, e.g., MrrCHELL, supra note 5, at 80 (suggesting that outright requirements
and funding coercion probably will not pass constitutional muster); How to Ensure
Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15 (same).
169 See, e.g., LANOUE & ScHRoTr, supra note 5, at 155-56 (noting one commenta-
tor's argument that linking federal matching funds to debate participation would
intrude on "the candidates' freedom to seek votes in whatever legal manner they
deem most beneficial" and "would have negative implications for democratic theory
far beyond whatever benefits are derived from the debates themselves"); MITCHELL,
supra note 5, at 5 (concluding that while presidential debates should become a regular
feature of the campaign, they should not be mandated by law or regulation); How to
Ensure Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15 (arguing that, despite the value of
presidential debates, "it seems unwise for the government to intrude on this aspect
of campaign decision-making").
170 For example, Sen. Graham has said:
[U]ncertainty ... about whether debates will occur can destroy their
effectiveness and purpose .... If both voter and candidate knew the debates
were going to happen, then more time could be spent on preparation than
on campaign staffs negotiating their candidates out of having the debate.
Voters could count on a forum to provide them with knowledge with which
they could comfortably go to the polls.
137 CONG. REC. S6102 (daily ed. May 17, 1991).
Without institutionalization, candidates can insist on their terms, and if these
terms are not met, they can walk away without fear of retribution. See Germond &
Witcover, supra note 11, at 1244. Columnist David Broder has argued that the
debates belong to the public and not the candidates: "'We have accepted ... far too
passively the notion that it is up to the candidates and their advisers to determine
what takes place and what's talked about, and how it's talked about in a presidential
campaign.'" 137 CONG. REc. E643 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Markey)
(quoting Broder, and further stating that the public "deserves and should demand
substantive debates in return for its investment"); 137 CONG. REc. E397 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 1991) (statement of Rep. Penny) (arguing that institutionalization will "help
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recognize that making reception of public funds contingent on
participation is an effective way to insure that debates occur.
17 1
It is also an acknowledgement that candidates have an obligation to
inform and educate the populace whose tax dollars subsidize their
campaigns. 172 Conditioning funds on participation may, in fact,
be the only method for insuring that "significant" minor-party or
independent candidates are included in debates with nominees of
the two major parties, rather than being left to debate amongst
themselves or to rely on some other form of television expo-
sure.173 Ironically, Ross Perot's presence on the 1992 presidential
debates, rather than assuring future minor-party candidates of slots
on these fora, may have decreased the likelihood of future third-
party participation. As one commentator notes, "Perot's perfor-
mance as both wild-card and trump-card is likely to give future
incumbents pause about permitting third-party candidates
aboard." 174 Institutionalization is thus a proposal of pressing
moment.
As a threshold matter, one should understand that proposals for
debate institutionalization do not entail compulsory debate
participation by major-party candidates. Compelling a candidate to
to rekindle dwindling voter participation and interest in our elections"); How to Ensure
Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15 (reasoning that institutionalizing debates would
prevent "speculation over them from overshadowing other elements of the campaign,
including the debates themselves").
171 Institutionalization also insures that candidates cannot extract concessions as
to debate format and substance by threatening to refuse to participate. See Susan E.
Spotts, Recent Developments, The Presidential Debates Act of 1992, 29 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 561,561 (1992) (observing that in 1988, "[s]ince the candidates had the power
to decide whether or not they would debate, they were able to dictate the terms of
the debate"). Absent institutionalization, "presidential debates are scheduled only
when campaign managers find them beneficial to their candidates' campaign
strategies, rather than when they would be most helpful for the voters." Id.
172 See id. at 562.
173 See id. at 575-79; see also MIrCHELL, supra note 5, at 87 (arguing that major-
party candidates are not likely to agree voluntarily to debate minor-party or
independent candidates). Organizing separate debates for minor-party candidates and
major-party candidates has been attempted. Such a proposal, however, is self-
defeating because the very point of opening the debates is to include minor-party and
independent candidates in a forum with the major-party candidates, and thus assure
such candidates of an ample atidience and the ensuing benefits that can only obtain
with a major-party presence. As a case in point, a 1992 presidential debate organized
for alternative candidates was attended by merely 180 people, while the second Bush-
Clinton-Perot televised debate attracted about 80 million viewers. See G.L. Marshall,
Alternative Candidates Offer Sharp Contrast, UPI, Oct. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
174 Omicinski, supra note 167.
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speak both at a certain time and in a particular forum would be
violative of the First Amendment. 175 Rather, the proposals simply
threaten to withhold certain federal funds from major-party
candidates who skirt debates with "significant" and national third-
party or independent nominees. The assumption is that this threat
will function as a sufficient incentive to insure appearance of the
Democratic and Republican candidates. Given the vast amount of
money received by major-party candidates through public funding,
this assumption would seem a sound one.176 Yet one must still
inquire as to whether tying receipt of federal funds to participation
in certain debates is an unconstitutional restraint on speech.
The constitutionality of such legislation is supported by several
cases in which the Court has upheld the government's right to
choose what types of activities it wishes to subsidize. 177  Those
who object to making receipt of federal campaign funds contingent
on participation in presidential debates contend that such a statute
is an impermissible congressional burden on freedom of speech,
and thus violative of the First Amendment. 178 Since there is no
175 The First Amendment also comprehends the right not to speak. See, e.g.,
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (stating that First Amendment
protection includes "both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all").
176 During the 1992 primary elections alone, Clinton received $12.5 million in
matching funds, and Bush $10.1 million. See FEC NEWS RELEASE, supra note 84, at
1. Of the $173.7 million the 1992 election cost the American taxpayers, $155.2
million went to the two major candidates, with Clinton and his campaign receiving
$78.8 million, and Bush and his campaign $76.4 million. See Campaign Cost, supra
note 78.
177 This point is perhaps best illustrated by the line of abortion funding and so-
called "gag-order" cases. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991)
(holding that federal regulations did not violate the Constitution where they
prohibited projects that receive Title X funds from counseling, referring, or providing
information regarding abortion as a method of family planning); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,507-11 (1989) (holding that the government
has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because it is constitutionally
protected and may choose to allocate public funds for medical services relating to
childbirth and not for abortions); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540 (1983) (upholding as constitutional the denial of tax benefits to nonprofit
organizations exercising their First Amendment right to lobby); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 312-18 (1980) (holding that the federal government or states may refuse to
fund medically necessary abortions because the existence of a constitutionally
protected right does not obligate the government to grant the funds necessary to
exercise that right).
178 Put another way, institutionalization implicates the doctrine of "unconstitution-
al conditions," which states that "the government may not grant a benefit on the
condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold that benefit altogether." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
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constitutional entitlement to campaign funds, however, the
government may make one course of action more attractive than
another by choosing to fund only the activity it wishes to encour-
age. 179 Here, the government wants to encourage participation
in debates. Making one choice (participation in certain debates)
preferable to another (non-participation) by funding only candidates
choosing the former clearly is not analogous to a naked penalty of
or an impermissible burden on those who exercise their First
Amendment right not to participate in debates. In short, insofar as
institutionalization comprehends a decision to fund a particular
activity, legislative use of a carrot rather than a stick is permissible
under the Supreme Court's most recent decisions.
Two Supreme Court opinions, however, reject government
attempts to tailor provision of benefits to the relinquishment of
First Amendment rights, thereby offering contradictory analy-
sis.180 Accordingly, institutionalization would represent an imper-
missible condition on speech rather than a permissible funding
regulation. Yet one commentator suggests that even if the Court
were inclined to follow the contradictory analysis espoused by these
cases in future suits, two matching-fund cases still urge the constitu-
tionality of a bill tying reception of federal campaign funds to
debate participation. 181  Finding such a bill unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1415, 1415 (1989). Here, the constitutional right is
freedom of speech, the benefit, campaign funds.
179 See supra note 177.
180 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (finding unconstitu-
tional an act that denied eligibility for federal funding to those broadcasters who
choose to editorialize); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (finding unconstitu-
tional a state college's attempt to condition a professor's continued employment on
the professor's promise to refrain from exercising his constitutional right to criticize
the school administration).
181 See Spotts, supra note 171, at 570-79 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(conditioning receipt of federal matchingfunds on a candidate's agreement to accept
certain expenditure limitations is permissible, since a "significant interference" with
the candidate's constitutional rights may be overridden by a "sufficiently important"
governmental interest), and Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (conditioning eligibility for matching funds on
a candidate's agreement to accept expenditure limitations did not violate First
Amendment)). Analyzing legislative initiatives to institutionalize debates, Spotts
concludes that the government has a sufficiently important interest in requiring
major-party participation in debates in order to assure that the American voter is well-
informed; that debates offer the best hope for providing voters with a serious
discussion of the issues, and so institutionalization proposals satisfy the constitutional
requirement of narrow-tailoring- and that the candidates' First Amendment rights are
not unduly infringed by such legislation. See Spotts, supra note 171, at 570-75. In
addition, Spotts offers the argument that adoption of a bill providing for a non-major-
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would likely threaten Rust and necessitate heroic judicial efforts at
distinguishing the abortion-funding, gag-order, and matching-fund
cases from a legislative proposal to use federal funding to encourage
debate participation. 182 Given that the weight of Supreme Court
precedent is aligned with the constitutionality of institutionalization,
such a bill would likely pass constitutional muster.
183
B. Three Proposals
In discussing three recent proposals for institutionalizing
debates, we must examine them in the context of their potential for
insuring the inclusion of significant third-party or independent
candidates. 184  Representative Charles Bennett's Presidential
Candidate Debate Act of 1991 would amend the Internal Revenue
Code to require "certain [presidential] candidates" to participate in
debates in order to receive payments under the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act. 185 This bill also would amend § 9002 of the
Internal Revenue Code by defining "presidential candidate debate"
as "a debate at which each candidate nominated for election to the
office of President of the United States by a major party appears
party presence on nationally televised debates would actually strengthen the
governmental interest, inasmuch as "inclusion of third-party candidates could
significantly improve the educational value of the debates." Id. at 579.
182 Additionally, there are countervailing constitutional interests that factor into
the calculus, militating against a finding of unconstitutionality. Chief among them
are (1) the rights of the auditors, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);
(2) the rights of minor-party candidates, see Magarian, supra note 96, at 857 (arguing
that even though both the Second and D.C. Circuits denied Lenora Fulani's appeals
for inclusion in televised debates, "the fact that neither [court] challenged Fulani's
constitutional bases confirms the constitutional tenor of [her] alleged injuries"); and
(3) the rights of voters, see 138 S. 2213, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1992) (stating that
"the right of eligible citizens to participate in the election process as informed voters,
provided in and derived from the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion, has consistently been protected and promoted by the Federal Government").
183 This conclusion is shared by Spotts, supra note 171, at 568-79; see also Michael
Kovaka & Arthur Block, Rainbow Lobby, Inc., Statement in Support of The
Democracy in Presidential Debates Act (H.R. 791) and the Presidential Debates Act
of 1992 (S. 2213): The First Amendment Issues, at 26 (May 1, 1992) (on file with
author) (concluding that Penny's bill is constitutional, even if it minimally infringes
First Amendment rights).
184 Some of the substantive provisions of these bills, such as those concerning the
number and length of the debates, and the topics to be covered, are beyond the scope
of the present inquiry.
18 See H.R. 60, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of purpose). As of
January 3,1991, the bill had attracted no co-sponsors. H.R. 60: Presidential Candidate
Debate Act of 1991, Bill Tracking Rep.,Jan. 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Bltrck File.
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and participates." 186  This restrictive definition of "debate,"
however, would neither foster the likelihood of a third-party
candidate being invited to participate, nor exact a penalty from the
major-party candidates for refusing to debate a "significant" third-
party or independent candidate. This bill clearly contemplates
compulsory debates between the two major-party candidates only.
In contrast, the National Presidential Debates Act, co-sponsored
by Senator Bob Graham and Representative Edward Markey, has as
its goal amending the Internal Revenue Code to require "any
general election candidate" receiving money from the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund to participate in debates "with other such
candidates." 1 7 Significantly, this provision would seem to assure
a third-party or independent candidate who received federal
matching funds a spot on the televised presidential debates.
188
The bill is flawed, however, because it further provides that the
debate sponsor be "a nonpartisan or bipartisan organization".
189
This provision is intended to preserve the role of the 1988 and 1992
debate sponsor, the CPD.1 90
CPD sponsorship of the debates has generated a spate of critical
commentary, much of it denouncing a perceived attempt by the
major parties to perpetuate their monopolistic control of the
electoral system and the electorate. 191 The tenor of some of the
186 H.R. 60, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
187 S. 491, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of purpose); H.R. 1112, 102d
Cong., 1stSess. (1991) (statement of purpose). The House and Senate versions of the
bill are identical. For convenience's sake, the Comment shall hereinafter refer
exclusively to the Senate version. As of June 6, 1991, the House bill had 26 co-
sponsors, 24 of whom were Democrats. See H.R. 1112: National Presidential Debates
Act of1991, Bill Tracking Rep.,June 6,1991, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck
File. As of February 26, 1991, the Senate bill had not attracted any co-sponsors. See
S. 491: National Presidential Debates Act of 1991, Bill Tracking Rep., Feb. 26, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File.
188 For an explanation of how one qualifies for federal matching funds, see supra
note 79.
189 S. 491,102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1991) (this provision would amend chapter
95 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for debate sponsorship).
190 The word "bipartisan" was added "to include the possibility of sponsorship by
the [CPD], which skillfully staged the 1988 general election debates and which has
continued to play an active and positive role in calling for institutionalized debates."
137 CONG. REC. E643 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Markey). For a
discussion of the CPD's role in the 1988 debates, see supra note 114.
191 See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 58 (arguing that the debates should be
sponsored by a nonpartisan organization because ceding control to the major parties
insures that format and issue determination will be motivated by what is best for the
major-party candidates rather than by what is most conducive to informing the
public); Debates and Public Service, supra note 113, at 15 ("[T]he commission, co-
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commentary suggests that entrusting the interests of third-party and
independent candidates to the Democratic and Republican parties
is akin to asking the fox to guard the henhouse.1 92 This concern
about major-party manipulation would arise even if-as in the
National Presidential Debates Act-it were not left to the parties to
set the criteria for inclusion in the debates.1 9 The Democratic
chaired by the two Parties' Chairmen, would by its makeup be inclined to exclude
third-party challengers."); Goodman, supra note 5, at 56 ("[T]he appearance of party
control over the most important 60-minute sequences in the political process is bad
for folks in the living room."); Knight, supra note 114 (quoting Martin Lee, analyst
from the media watchdog group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), claiming
that major-party control of the debate process means that issues "are not going to be
raised in a way that are [sic] going to question the two-party consensus"); Mark
Sullivan, Dateline: Washington, States News Serv., Nov. 26, 1985, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, SNS File (quoting Dorothy S. Ridings, Chairwoman of the League of
Women Voters, who queries: "[t]he moment conflicting demands by the candidates
surfaced, who would fill the role of a third party honest broker to resolve the
conflicts?"). But see JAMIESON & BIRDSELL, supra note 8, at 213 (supporting party
sponsorship of debates because it best insures participation by major-party nominees);
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 57 (stating that responsibility for the debates would not
be inconsistent with the parties' present role, which already includes facilitating the
presentation of the candidates to the public through the provision of advice,
personnel, and facts); How to Ensure Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15 (arguing
that party sponsorship is advantageous because the parties' close relationship with the
candidates enables them to accomplish most of the debate planning in advance of the
campaign).
192 See, e.g., Debates and Public Service, supra note 113, at 15 (suggesting that the
Commission would be inclined to give third-party candidates short shrift); How to
Ensure Presidential Debates, supra note 8, at 15 (noting that the inclusion of third-party
and independent candidates poses especially difficult problems if the major parties
are sponsors of the debates); Sullivan, supra note 191 ("[M]aking the two parties
responsible would effectively rule out appearances of strong independent candidates
and make it unlikely that debates would be held."). But see Who'll Protect the John
Andersons?, supra note 114, at A30 (arguing that CPD sponsorship would be no worse
for third-party candidates than would the nonpartisan sponsorship of a group like the
League of Women Voters, which dropped Anderson in order to insure a Carter-
Reagan debate in 1980).
"3 Allowing major parties to choose criteria for inclusion seems naive, since they
have little incentive to voluntarily include minor-party candidates. They lack such
incentive because conventional wisdom suggests that a lesser-known political figure
invariably gains credibility by sharing the political spotlight of his better-known
competitor. See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 72 ("Even Stephen Douglas recognized
before his first debate with Lincoln that, as the better known of the two and the
favorite, he had little to gain."); Wicker, supra note 7, at A23 ("Why... give a less-
familiar opponent an equal platform before a large television audience? Having done
that was one of the prime reasons Richard Nixon lost the Presidency toJohn Kennedy
in 1960."). "[E]very debate carries a risk, whether a slip of the tongue, lack of ease,
an unfortunate mannerism, or the danger of being deflated by an opponent's
oneliner." MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, supra note 7 (remarks of Roger Mudd). Thus,
incumbents have traditionally been reluctant to debate their chief challengers, let
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and Republican parties are ipso facto partisan, and their leadership
is primarily concerned with "looking for ways to enhance the rele-
vance of their own institutions on the political scene." 194 If this
enhancement is achieved by determinations about debate substance
and format that trammel the interests of third-party candidates,
there is no reason to assume that the major parties would be
deterred by considerations of equity and fair play.
195
Events leading up to the 1992 debates, however, suggest an
ironic truth about the CPD: rather than functioning as an accom-
plice of the major-party candidates, it has been relegated to the
victim role formerly assumed by the League, a toothless patsy
prostrate before the beck and whim of the Democratic and
Republican campaigns. Not until October did the two major parties
reach agreement about the debates, and such accord came only after
weeks of posturing over details, and without any CPD input.
196
Four months earlier, in June 1992, the CPD had announced a
debate schedule that Bush rejected, resulting in Clinton's solo
appearance at the first two debate sites.1 97 The two campaigns
did not even announce that the CPD was to sponsor the debates
until October 2, 1992.198 Once the debates were announced, and
despite the CPD's intent to avoid a process whereby either side
could blackball journalists deemed unfriendly or unfair, the two
campaigns insisted on both a say in the choice of questioners and
"veto authority." 199 As White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater
alone minor-party candidates who pose little threat. Major-party candidates, with little
to gain from debates against lesser-known opponents and much to lose, are heedful
of the maxim: "Never debate down. Always debate up." Id. (quoting former
President Richard Nixon, who refused to debate either Humphrey in 1968 or
McGovern in 1972). But see LANOUE & SCHROTT, supra note 5, at 37 (suggesting that
because Reagan lost nothing by accepting Mondale's challenge to debate in 1984, it
can no longer be argued with certainty that presidential debates invariably help the
lesser-known candidate). Perot's presence on the 1992 debates seemed neither to
help nor hinder one of the two major-party candidates vis-a-vis the other. Cf. supra
note 116.
194 Debates and Public Service, supra note 113, at 15.
195 At the founding of the CPD, its chairmen offered ajoint statement in which
they expressed the belief that the CPD would enable them better to fulfill their party
responsibilities. See Debates Gave Voters, supra note 4, at 3.
196 See Michael Kranish, Accord on Three Debates Reported, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2,
1992, at 1.
197 See id.
198 See Richard L. Berke, Bush and Clinton Agree on Debates; Plan to Ask Perot, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992, at 1.199 See Howard Kurtz, Journalists Posing Debate Questions to be Chosen by Bush,
Clinton, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1992, atA23; Lori Santos, Debate Panel Selectedfor Sunday
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admitted: "The commission is not in control. We are-the two-
candidates."
200
CPD sponsorship of the debates may thus present third-party
and independent candidates with a double-edged sword: a biparti-
san debate sponsor, and major-party candidates who refuse to be
guided by "bipartisan" determinations not deemed to maximize
their individual interests.
Finally, the Democracy in Presidential Debates Act, recently
introduced by Representative Timothy Penny, is the most promising
of the three bills because it intentionally obviates the handicaps the
other two proposals pose for minor-party or independent candi-
dates.20 1 First, Penny's bill would restrict debate sponsorship to
nonpartisan entities, a criterion that would scuttle the CPD's
controversial role. 20 2 The legislation would also oblige all candi-
dates receiving primary federal matching funds and qualifying for
the ballot in at least forty states-either as their party's nominee or
Face-Off, UPI, Oct. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
20 Leslie Phillips, Debates: BigEffor But Little Progress, USA ToDAY, Oct. 1, 1992,
at 12A. The CPD's capitulation to the two campaigns in 1992 was reminiscent of its
behavior four years earlier. In 1988 the CPD acceded to all demands made by the
two campaigns: both campaigns chose the moderators and panelists, no follow-up
questions were permitted, both sides packed the audience with supporters, and the
Dukakis camp even succeeded in getting a ramp built to make its candidate look
taller. See id.
201 See H.R. 791, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Bill sponsor Rep. Penny has
explained that the legislation "sets objective criteria for the inclusion of significant
national independent and minor party candidates .... In the interests of fairness and
free and open dialog[ue], all significant candidates who meet the stringent criteria set
forth in this legislation must be included in the debates." 137 CONG. REc. E397 (daily
ed. Feb 4., 1991). As of October 5, 1992, the Democracy in Presidential Debates Act
had attracted 28 co-sponsors, 27 of whom were Democrats. See H.R 791: Democracy
in PresidentialDebates Act of 1991, Bill Tracking Rep., Oct. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Bltrck File.
2 See H.R. 791, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991); 137 CONG. REC. E398 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Penny) (noting that a nonpartisan sponsor will
"gnarantee[] that the format of the debates will be in the voters' interests, not the
candidates' interests"). Sponsor Rep. Penny aptly summarized the merits of legislative
inclusion of third-party candidates in an institutionalized debate format: more robust
political dialogue, greater voter participation, the democratization of a major element
of the campaign process and, in short, better debates. See id.
Democratic Sen. Paul Wellstone ofMinnesota is sponsoring a substantially similar
sister bill in the Senate. See S. 2213, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Wellstone's bill
provides for three debates rather than Penny's two, and links the obligation to
participate in debates to the receipt of any federal general election campaign funding,
rather than merely the receipt of matching funds. See id. § 2. Because Wellstone's
proposal is similar in many respects to Rep. Penny's legislation, it does not merit
detailed separate treatment in this Comment.
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as an independent candidate-to participate in debates organized by
the nonpartisan sponsor.20 3 These inclusion criteria are truly
objective, and carefully calibrated to capture only significant,
national third-party or independent candidates. Pursuant to these
criteria, only two non-major-party candidates would have been
invited to the 1988 debates, 20 4 and two would have been invited
in 1992.2°5 With the addition of the major party candidates, the
Democracy in Presidential Debates Act would have thus compre-
hended four debate participants in both 1988 and 1992, a number
that seems eminently practicable.
This Comment now examines the various criteria that have been
proposed for determining who should be included in nationally
televised debates. Most of these standards pose special problems
for non-major-party aspirants. This section will conclude with a
suggestion for adopting those criteria that will maximize participa-
tion in televised presidential debates by significant national third-
party or independent candidates, while still selectively restricting
access to these fora. Since Representative Penny's Democracy in
Presidential Debates Act contains such criteria, this Comment will
urge its adoption.
C. Toward Objective Selection Criteria
In 1980, the League of Women Voters established threshold
requirements for candidates to participate on the nationally
televised debates.20 6 The standards included: meeting constitu-
tional age and citizenship requirements; gaining nomination on
203 See H.R. 791, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c)(1), (2). The financial qualifications
can also be met if the candidate "has raised not less than $500,000 on or afterJanuary
1 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year of the Presidential
election." Id. § 3(c)(2)(A), (B).
204 See Spotts, supra note 171, at 576-77 (noting that the Libertarian Party's Ron
Paul and the New Alliance Party's Lenora Fulani would have met the bill's criteria).
205 In 1992, such criteria would have allowed the participation of Fulani and
Libertarian candidate Andre Marrou. Ross Perot, ironically, would not have qualified
for the debates under Penny's bill, since he neither received public funding, nor
raised the necessary $500,000 within the stated time period. See supra note 203.
Perot's technical failure to meet the inclusion criteria can be attributed to his
anomalous candidacy, and his eleventh-hour declaration as a presidential aspirant.
The spirit of Penny's bill, however, would clearly embrace a Ross Perot. His
candidacy should thus be instructive, serving to guide those redrafting the bill before
its eventual reintroduction by illustrating a possible oversight in the financial
eligibility provision.
206 For a description of the League's 1987 primary election debate criteria, see
Barmann, supra note 16, at 451 n.50.
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state ballots sufficient to have a mathematical possibility of winning
in the Electoral College; and demonstrating sufficient voter interest
and support, which one could accomplish either by virtue of a major
party's nomination, or a fifteen percent support level in several
national public opinion polls.
207
The League's focus on potential for electoral victory was unduly
restrictive. Framing the chief requirement for inclusion in terms of
statistical likelihood of attaining the presidency is tantamount to an
admission that the principal function of debates is to showcase the
only two candidates who traditionally have a chance of winning: the
Democratic and Republican nominees. Such a view does not
acknowledge the potential debates hold for enriching the national
dialogue, a potential that could best be exploited by the presence of
significant third-party or independent candidates who bring
alternative viewpoints to bear on the major issues of the day. Use
of polls is similarly flawed; they should be avoided because they are
at once unreliable and subject to manipulation for the benefit of
major parties.
208
In 1988 and 1992, the CPD utilized criteria whose focus on
potential for electoral victory was even more restrictive, and
substantially more subjective, than that of the League. 20 9  The
207 See Dunn, supra note 68, at 652 n.140 (quoting League of Women Voters
Education Fund Criterion Statement, Aug. 10, 1980). Only five minor-party candidates
would have met these criteria in the twentieth century: John Anderson in 1980;
George Wallace in 1968; Henry Wallace in 1948; Robert LaFollette in 1924; and
Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. See id. at 652 n.141. Ross Perot would not have met
these criteria, since his support had dropped into single digits by the time he
reannounced his bid for the presidency. See Robin Toner, Poll Finds Hostility to Perot
and No Basic Shift in Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1992, at Al.
208 See Bonafede, supra note 71, at 1898 ("Pollsters are the first to admit that voter
surveys are little more than snapshots of public attitudes and are vulnerable to
immediate change. Pollingstatistics can be manipulated, and many office seekers are
not above using them capriciously"). The League of Women Voters' actions in 1980
serve as a classic example of the misuse of polling statistics. The League utilized a
numerical threshold: a candidate with 15% support in a national opinion poll was
invited to the debate, provided she had satisfied other criteria. See Who'll Protect the
John Andersons?, supra note 114, at A30. When Anderson's support waned, the
League refused to allow him to participate in the second debate, despite his national
stature. See Cooper, supra note 99, at 1885. The 20th-Century Fund Task Force
rejected the use of putatively objective "criteria" such as polls in determining the
"significan[ce]" of a given candidate. See How to Ensure Presidential Debates, supra note
8, at 15 ("[The League of Women Voters' use of polls] adds to the artifice of
presidential debates because it gives an inherently subjective and political judgment
a patina of science and objectivity."). The Task Force concluded that criteria for
determining which qualifications make a "significant" candidate could not be fixed
in advance. See id.2 09 See COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA
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CPD's policy was to extend automatic debate invitations to the two
major-party candidates, since the continuous monopoly on the
presidency enjoyed by the two major parties for over a century is
indicative of an "historical prominence and sustained voter interest"
warranting automatic inclusion.210 Though one cannot quibble
with this truism, the subsequent provision declaring that "any
[other] candidate with a realistic chance of winning the general elec-
tion"211 shall be granted an invitation is problematic. Use of
amorphous standards-such as "realistic chance of winning" or a
"viable" candidacy-should be avoided, for by focusing on potential
for electoral success, these standards are simply inadequate for
safeguarding third-party interests.
In an effort to fill out the content of its "realistic chance"
benchmark, the GPD elucidated a host of criteria to guide its
determinations of who merits an invitation to the debates.
12
These criteria reveal how the deck is stacked against minor
candidates, for they seem to have been chosen so as to guarantee
that no one can fulfill them. 213 The criteria require candidates to
demonstrate: (1) evidence of a national organization; 214 (2) signs
of national competitiveness and newsworthiness; 215 and (3) indica-
FOR 1992 GENERAL ELECTION DEBATE PARTICIPATION (1992) [hereinafter CANDIDATE
SELECTION CRITERIA] (on file with author). The CPD's more detailed guidelines were
developed with the help of an advisory committee chaired by Harvard's Richard
Neustadt. Because the 1992 criteria were similar in most respects to the 1988 criteria,
albeit more comprehensive, this Comment will refer only to the 1992 criteria.
210 Id. at 1.
211 Id. This "realistic chance" touchstone means that the candidate's name must
be present on ballots in enough states to win 270 electoral votes, the constitutional
minimum a presidential aspirant needs to be elected.
212 See id. at 2-4.
213 See, e.g., Fulani II, 935 F.2d 1324, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reporting Lenora
Fulani's contention that "the CPD is engaging in a program of political misinforma-
tion, perpetuating bipartisan, rather than nonpartisan, political debates"). Barmann
argues that "realistic chance" criteria function as "unreasonable restriction[s] that
serve[] the major parties at the expense of the educational value of the debates....
Not evenJohn Anderson had a 'realistic chance of being elected'in 1980." Barmann,
supra note 16, at 453. If these criteria were diligently followed, even Ross Perot, a
1992 debate participant, would have had no such "realistic chance." See infra note
225.
214 See CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 209, at 2-3. The factors to be
considered for national organization include: placement on the ballot in enough
states to have a mathematical chance of obtaining an Electoral College majority;
organization in a majority of congressional districts in those states; declaration of a
third-party or independent candidacy before the major party conventions or
primaries; and eligibility for campaign funds from the Federal Election Commission.
Id.
215 See id. at 3. Factors to be considered in this regard include the professional
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tors of national public enthusiasm or concern. 216 The consider-
able detail the CPD relies on, however, cannot obscure the twofold
problem with the criteria: they are inherently subjective, and the
CPD applies them in admittedly subjective fashion.
217
The criteria, in fact, are skewed to foster exclusion at every turn.
By requiring eligibility for matching funds from the FEC, for
example, the "national organization" criterion of the CPD is more
restrictive than the eligibility requirements contained in Rep.
Penny's bill.218 As for "national newsworthiness and competi-
tiveness," the factors used in that determination disadvantage
minor-party candidates by relying on professional media opinions
and column inches of coverage.219 As a conservative institution
essentially interested in preserving the status quo, 220 the media
opinions of the Washington bureau chiefs of major newspapers, news magazines and
broadcast networks; the opinions of professional campaign managers and pollsters
not currently employed by the two major-party candidates; the opinions of electoral
politics specialists at major universities and research centers; column inches on
newspaper front pages and exposure on network telecasts in comparison with major-
party candidates; and published views of prominent political commentators. See id.
216 See id. at 3-4. Factors used for this determination are the findings of "signifi-
cant" public opinion polls and reported attendance at meetings and rallies across the
country in comparison with the Democratic and Republican candidates. See id. at 4.
217 The CPD states that the "nonpartisan criteria" upon which it relies for
selection of non-major party candidates "contemplate no quantitative threshold that
triggers automatic inclusion in a Commission-sponsored debate." Id. at 1. Applying
such criteria, apparently, the CPD determines which third-party or independent
candidates have a "more than theoretical" possibility of being elected.2 18 See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text. Rep. Penny's bill offers an
alternative to qualifying for matching funds: raising at least $500,000 on or afterJan.
I of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year of the presidential
election. See supra note 203. The Libertarian Party is ideologically opposed to
receiving federal matching funds; therefore, its candidate Andre Marrou would fail
this CPD criterion, but qualify for debate inclusion under Rep. Penny's bill. See
Spotts, supra note 171, at 567.
Further, another factor weighed in assessing existence of a "national organiza-
tion" under the CPD criteria is whether declaration of the third-party candidacy
occurred prior to the major-party convention. See CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA,
supra note 209, at 2. This factor could be invoked against a third-party candidate who
threatens to steal the thunder from the national conventions by a late announcement
of her candidacy. It also cuts against Ross Perot, whose candidacy was announced a
little more than a month before the 1992 election.
219 See supra note 215.
220 See generally BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (3d ed. 1990).
Bagdikian argues that the national political dialogue has become sterile in part
because of the media's failure to reflect "the full range of ideas and programs that
exist in American thinking and expertise." Id. at 237. He attributes this failure to the
concentration of media power in the hands of media corporations who share a
uniformity of outlook. See id. at 223; see also ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 37.
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naturally expends most of its ink on major-party candidates.
Additionally, the media's predilection for presenting the presiden-
tial campaign as a horse race bolsters a journalistic tendency to
focus on only the two major-party candidates, 221 while simulta-
neously characterizing only those candidates favored with such
attention as "competitive" and "newsworthy." The media's
overarching interest in who will win rather than in what the
candidates are saying assures that third-party candidates will get
short shrift. 222 Finally, "public enthusiasm or concern" is also
deficient as a criterion, primarily because it resorts to polls.
223
In sum, the CPD selection criteria fail to give non-major party
candidates a fair shake. The criteria are substantively subjective,
and are applied subjectively; they depend upon factors catering to
the establishment, standards pursuant to which minor-party
candidates cannot succeed. Moreover, they are applied by a major-
party organization powerless to hold sway over its own candi-
dates,2 24 as evidenced by the hypocrisy of the decision to include
Ross Perot in the 1992 debates.
225
221 See Dunn, supra note 68, at 649.
222 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 35. As one prominentjournalist put
it:
We base [our decision] on the simple proposition that readers don't want
to waste their time on someone who won't have a role in the campaign.
We're not going to run a page-one spread on a fringe candidate. We don't
have a multiparty system. Until we do, nobody's going to cover these
candidates.
Id. (quotingJames M. Perry of the Wall Street Journal).
For a discussion of the fallacy of relying on polls, see supra note 208.
224 See supra note 196.
22 The circumstances of Perot's inclusion smacked of manipulation by the two
major-party candidates. On October 2, 1992, the Bush and Clinton campaigns
announced that theywere inviting Ross Perot to participate in the debates. See Berke,
supra note 198, at 1. In a joint statement, the two parties explained that Perot's
invitation was extended "in anticipation" of expected CPD approval. Id. In fact, Bush
campaign officials claimed that "they got their way in allowing Mr. Perot to take part
despite objections from the Clinton negotiators who had wanted the debate
commission to decide that." Id. On October 6, 1992, Perot accepted the Bush-
Clinton invitation to appear on the debates. See Kevin Sacks, Perot Charts Poor
Economy in 30-Minute TV Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at A16. By Oct. 7, 1992,
when the CPD finally invited Perot, the invitation thus seemed, by all accounts, the
rubber stamp to a fait accompli. See No Surprise, But It's Official; Perot in Debates, Oct.
7,1992, Reuters, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File (noting that the CPD's
invitation to Perot was considered a "formality," since he had "already accepted the
invitations of the Bush and Clinton camps which set up the ground rules for the
debates").
The circumstances surrounding Perot's official invitation certainly cast doubt on
the CPD's independence, but its credibility is also at issue, since Perot arguably did
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Although they can disadvantage third-party and independent
candidates vis-4-vis major-party contenders, 22 6 ballot access re-
quirements may be a valid criterion for inclusion. Provided that a
ballot-access criterion requires a candidate to gain access to the
ballot in only an appreciable number of states, such a requirement
can filter out the dozens of frivolous, single-issue candidates who
surface during each election while preserving the interests of those
few third-party or independent candidates with significant national
backing. " ' The Democracy in Presidential Debates Act would
appear to come closest to this goal by requiring qualification for the
ballot in only forty states and through a careful combination of
funding and ballot requirements.22 8  This approach recognizes
not meet the CPD's asserted "realistic chance" criteria. On October 6, 1992, a CNN
correspondent reported that
one of the big concerns all along has been Perot's eligibility. The commis-
sion rulers say, "He has to have a realistic chance of winning the general
election." That was a problem since so many polls showed that Perot was
down in the polls. What they did is they kind of finessed that. Harvard
Professor Richard Neustadt, and his adviser committee, recommended to
the commission that Perot had a "remote, but real, more than theoretical
chance," which they're interpreting as meaning that Perot should be in the
debates.
Inside Politics: Transcript #182 (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1992), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN File. A New York Times/CBS News poll reported that
same day that only seven percent of registered voters intended to vote for Perot. See
Toner, supra note 207, at Al. This is hardly consistent with the "national public
enthusiasm or concern" espoused by the CPD as a prerequisite to debate participa-
tion. See CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 209, at 3-4. Perot also did not
announce his candidacy before the major party conventions, a circumstance that
should have counted against him under the CPD's "evidence of national organization"
criterion. See id. at 2.226 Seesupra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. In 1988 only Bush, Dukakis, and
Fulani qualified for all 51 ballots. See Barmann, supra note 16, at 454. In 1992, only
Bush, Clinton, Marrou, and Perot were on 51 ballots. See FEC NEWS RELEASE, supra
note 84, at 1-3.
27 In 1988, about 280 people filed statements with the FEC indicating that they
considered themselves to be presidential candidates. See Fulani I, 882 F.2d 621, 625
(2d Cir. 1989).
228 See H.R. 791, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (1991); see also Barmann, supra note
16, at 465 ("Keeping the threshold low enough so that not all fifty states have to be
covered recognizes that third-party candidates are handicapped in many ways."); supra
notes 201-05 and accompanying text. Requiring a candidate to leap ballot access
hurdles in even 40 states is still a formidable task. As of September 28th, 1992, only
four third-party presidential candidates were on at least 20 ballots: Andre Marrou of
the Libertarian Party (in 50 states and the District of Columbia),John Hagelin of the
Natural Law Party (28 states and the District of Columbia), Lenora Fulani of the New
Alliance Party (39 states and the District of Columbia), and, of course, Ross Perot (50
states and the District of Columbia). See FEC NEWS RELEASE, supra note 84, at 1-3.
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that third-party and independent candidates are not similarly
situated with major-party candidates. The two-pronged test would
permit inclusion in presidential debates of those candidates who are
significant and national, and who can contribute to the national
dialogue, but who may not have a substantial likelihood of winning
the election. Conscientious application of Rep. Penny's judicious
criteria will enable significant third-party and independent candi-
dates to play a role in these debates without diluting these fora to
such an extent that they cease to be useful arenas for discussion. In
addition, such criteria will avert the problems of exclusion.
229
CONCLUSION
The presidential election of 1992 bore witness to a "remarkable
national sense of voter disgust with politics as usual".2 ° An
enduring faith in the electoral process underlays the electorate's
cynicism, however-a faith dramatized by a continuing quest for
ways to enhance both the meaning and informative value the
process holds for individual voters, and its capacity to grapple with
important issues. This desire to make of the process something
better found wing in the burgeoning twin interests in televised
debates and non-major party candidates. In 1992, televised debates
came of age: more debates were held than ever, and record
audiences tuned in to listen to what the candidates had to say.
231
The electorate also voiced its desire for alternative viewpoints in
ringing terms, spurring an independent candidate to the strongest
showing of any non-major-party nominee in eighty years.
Given this expressed desire for both televised debates and third
parties, any proposal that could improve either merits serious
consideration; a proposal that would simultaneously strengthen both
while enhancing the integrity of the political process, galvanizing
229 See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 83-84 ("[E]xduding [these candidates] from such
television exposure as the debates is unfair, is likely to sound the death knell of
dissent, and, even if our political system is indeed a two-party system, is likely to make
the Republican and Democratic parties the two parties."). Rep. Penny's bill has also
been endorsed by several other commentators. See Spotts, supra note 171, at 579-80
(arguing that the bill would assure that "voters could rely on televised debates for a
more substantive view of the candidates and their proposals" and that "voters will
receive information on significant third party candidates that may better represent
their concerns."); Kovaka & Block, supra note 183, at 7-8 (position paper, co-authored
by attorney for Lenora Fulani, arguing that the bill "will promote more speech, more
viewpoints, and a more level playing field").
230 Firestone, supra note 31, at 29.
231 See Kubasik, supra note 5, at 6.
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voter interest, reinforcing the egalitarian ideal of our democracy,
and improving the national dialogue, demands adoption. The
legislative institutionalization of debates is such a proposal. Yet all
institutionalization proposals are not created equal. Plans that
would apply artificially high or overly subjective criteria for third-
party or independent candidate inclusion, and those that would
perpetuate bipartisan sponsorship of debates, must be rejected as
self-defeating. Alternatively, this Comment urges the adoption of
Rep. Timothy Penny's Democracy in Presidential Debates Act, which
obviates the problems of other proposals and promises to nurture
both debates and third parties.
While the benefits of such reform will redound to the entire
polity, to Republicans and Democrats alike, institutionalization does
not offer the major parties profit without pain. Any incursion by a
third-party or independent candidate will only come at the expense
of the two-party symbiosis that has nurtured and sustained the
major parties' virtual monopoly on access to the political process.
The inclusion of several additional candidates in the debates,
however, poses little threat to the two-party hegemony. Rather, the
chief expense will be the costs associated with increased accountabil-
ity, and the increased efforts needed for consensus building. The
desire to reduce political costs, however, should not take prece-
dence over the merits of inclusion, over those tangible and
intangible benefits better debates and better third parties can
provide to all.
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